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> SQOUT, by QuDef, is a security intelligence and knowledge framework for quantum technologies. Its catalogue describes attacks, vulnerabilities, countermeasures and security proofs for quantum communication and quantum computing systems.
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# Non-Kinetic Physical Attack (A-0037)

Source: https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0037
Cite as: SQOUT (QuDef), https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0037, A-0037

- **QID:** A-0037
- **UUID:** fa981b6f-b124-44be-8da6-a69f0d3eb377
- **Type:** Classical
- **Domain(s):** Quantum Communication, Quantum Sensing & Imaging & Metrology
- **Tactic:** Impact
- **Updated:** 2026-11-12
- **Maturity:** Theoretical

## Description

A threat actor (Eve) damages or disrupts quantum-communication hardware at a distance and without physical contact, by delivering directed energy at it: a high-power laser or a high-power microwave beam. The target is the receiver (Bob) or the transmitter (Alice), either the optics and single-photon detector that terminate the quantum link or the supporting electronics of the quantum node, optical ground station, satellite or sensor that carries them [Krelina2023,Krelina2023a]. The classical analogue is a directed-energy weapon, and that analogy is the whole argument for the microwave arm: a quantum-communication satellite is an ordinary satellite carrying quantum-optical payloads, so the counterspace toolkit built for ordinary satellites applies to it unchanged [Krelina2023a]. The realised effect is denial or permanent destruction, and it does not recover when the attack stops.

This row covers the two upper bands of the laser-effect scale, permanent damage to the detector and thermal damage to the satellite bus, together with the microwave arm. The reversible band, in which bright light raises noise without damaging anything, is a separate technique, Quantum Channel Dazzling [A-0039]. Component damage delivered through a legitimate optical port in order to create a backdoor rather than an outage is Laser Damage Attack on Quantum Communication Systems [A-0058], and hands-on kinetic destruction of the same assets is Direct Physical Attack [A-0038]. Destroying a QKD node's physical entities defeats a mandatory protection requirement rather than merely being an unpleasant possibility [ITUX1713].

## Parent

- A-0048 Destruction <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0048>

## Technique-Countermeasures

- CM-0012 Continuous Device Functionality Monitoring <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0012>
- CM-0030 Quantum Device Optimal Design and TEMPEST <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0030>
- CM-0085 Quantum Network Traffic Rerouting <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0085>

## Technique-Layer Mappings

- CAT-0501 Electronics & Analog Components
- CAT-0500 Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical)

## Related Techniques

- A-0039 Quantum Channel Dazzling <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0039>

## Techniques Relating to This One

- A-0038 Direct Physical Attack <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0038>

## Literature

- [Bugge2014] Laser Damage Helps the Eavesdropper in Quantum Cryptography <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Bugge2014>
- [ITUX1713] ITU-T X.1713: Security requirements for the protection of quantum key distribution nodes <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/ITUX1713>
- [Krelina2023] Quantum Communication Countermeasures <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Krelina2023>
- [Krelina2023a] The Prospect of Quantum Technologies in Space for Defence and Security <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Krelina2023a>
- [Peng2024] Security boundaries of an optical power limiter for protecting quantum key distribution systems <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Peng2024>
- [Zhang2021] Securing Practical Quantum Communication Systems with Optical Power Limiters <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Zhang2021>

