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>
> SQOUT, by QuDef, is a security intelligence and knowledge framework for quantum technologies. Its catalogue describes attacks, vulnerabilities, countermeasures and security proofs for quantum communication and quantum computing systems.
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> How to use and cite this content: https://sqout.qudef.com/llms.txt

# Direct Physical Attack (A-0038)

Source: https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0038
Cite as: SQOUT (QuDef), https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0038, A-0038

- **QID:** A-0038
- **UUID:** 4476a898-db71-4cfe-9ee6-bcc29fa41868
- **Type:** Classical
- **Domain(s):** Quantum Communication
- **Tactic:** Impact
- **Updated:** 2026-11-12
- **Maturity:** Theoretical

## Description

A threat actor (Eve) physically destroys the equipment that carries a quantum-communication service: cutting the optical fibre or pulling out a span of it, smashing or carrying away a transmitter or receiver module, setting off a charge at a node or an optical ground station, or wrecking the power and cooling that keep a site running. The threat actor has to reach the asset and touch it, and has to know where it is first, but nothing beyond that is needed. Once the location of the fibres or the quantum nodes is known, a simple interruption suffices [Krelina2023].

Nothing is read and no key is stolen. The service stops and stays stopped until the fibre is spliced or re-laid or the equipment is replaced. A fibre cut belongs here because it needs such a repair: the published SQOUT framework gives cutting optical fibres as an example of physical destruction, and severing an exposed fibre as the example of its lowest threat band [Krelina2025]. Interruptions that end once the threat actor removes them, such as a fibre bend or a blocked free-space path, are [A-0118](/technique/A-0118). How much that costs depends on the network rather than on the act: a dense classical network absorbs the loss of several nodes by rerouting the traffic, and a low-density quantum network cannot [Krelina2023a]. A standards body treats the exposure as a control the operator was supposed to have rather than as bad luck, because a QKD node is required to provide boundary protection against physical intrusion and to protect against interruption of its physical entities [ITUX1713].

## Parent

- A-0048 Destruction <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0048>

## Technique-Countermeasures

- CM-0085 Quantum Network Traffic Rerouting <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0085>

## Technique-Layer Mappings

- CAT-0501 Electronics & Analog Components
- CAT-0506 Operational Security
- CAT-0500 Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical)

## Related Techniques

- A-0037 Non-Kinetic Physical Attack <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0037>

## Literature

- [Gaidash2022a] Quantum network security dependent on connection density between trusted nodes <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Gaidash2022a>
- [ITUX1713] ITU-T X.1713: Security requirements for the protection of quantum key distribution nodes <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/ITUX1713>
- [Krelina2023] Quantum Communication Countermeasures <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Krelina2023>
- [Krelina2023a] The Prospect of Quantum Technologies in Space for Defence and Security <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Krelina2023a>
- [Krelina2025] SQOUT: A Risk-Based Threat Analysis Framework for Quantum Communication Systems <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Krelina2025>
- [Lloyd2026] Risk Assessment of a Hypothetical Quantum Repeater Network Using SP 800-30 and the CIA Triad <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Lloyd2026>

