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# Quantum Channel Dazzling (A-0039)

Source: https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0039
Cite as: SQOUT (QuDef), https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0039, A-0039

- **QID:** A-0039
- **UUID:** c78aa481-0a33-4db6-9c46-9a5e8b19d151
- **Type:** Quantum
- **Domain(s):** Quantum Communication
- **Tactic:** Impact
- **Updated:** 2026-11-12
- **Maturity:** Theoretical

## Description

Quantum Channel Dazzling floods the receiver of a free-space or satellite quantum key distribution link with bright extraneous light, raising detector noise and the quantum bit error rate until key generation halts. It is the optical-domain equivalent of radio-frequency jamming, and it takes no key material: the link simply stops producing one. The threat actor (Eve) reaches the receiver (Bob) by either of two routes. In the direct route the laser is aimed into the receiver's own field of view, which is only a few to a few hundred microradians wide and leaves the attacker almost nowhere to stand. In the reflective route, which is the one the founding study analyses and the one all three sources treat as the realistic threat, the laser is aimed instead at the transmitting satellite (Alice) from a terminal that can sit a thousand kilometres away from the ground station; the satellite's own structure scatters a fraction of that light downward, and it arrives at the tracking receiver looking like ordinary background [Gozzard2021,Krelina2023,Simmons2023]. Scope here is the free-space and satellite ground-laser case; for the general fibre-and-free bright-light denial technique see Optical Jamming / Bright-Light Channel Denial [A-0119].

## Parent

- A-0047 Denial <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0047>

## Technique-Countermeasures

- CM-0030 Quantum Device Optimal Design and TEMPEST <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0030>
- CM-0026 Time Gating <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0026>
- CM-0085 Quantum Network Traffic Rerouting <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0085>

## Technique-Layer Mappings

- CAT-0500 Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical)
- CAT-0506 Operational Security

## Techniques Relating to This One

- A-0037 Non-Kinetic Physical Attack <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0037>

## Literature

- [Gozzard2021] Vulnerability of Satellite Quantum Key Distribution to Disruption from Ground-Based Lasers <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Gozzard2021>
- [Krelina2023] Quantum Communication Countermeasures <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Krelina2023>
- [Simmons2023] An investigation of jamming in free-space quantum key distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Simmons2023>
- [Tan2024] Framework and Classification of Indicator of Compromise for physics-based attacks <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Tan2024>

