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# Quantum Trojan-Horse Attack (THA) (A-0049)

Source: https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0049
Cite as: SQOUT (QuDef), https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0049, A-0049

- **QID:** A-0049
- **UUID:** 3cb972c2-9cb7-407f-9fd0-4add9f1b7c85
- **Type:** Quantum
- **Domain(s):** Quantum Communication
- **Tactic:** Execution
- **Updated:** 2026-11-12
- **Maturity:** Experimental

## Description

In a Quantum Trojan-Horse Attack (THA), a threat actor (Eve) learns the settings of a QKD system by reading light that leaves the apparatus through its own legitimate optical port, rather than by measuring the transmitted quantum states. Because she never touches those states, she induces none of the transmission errors that would disclose her, which is what makes the approach stealthy [Vakhitov2001].

The threat actor supplies that light herself, which is why the technique is also called the Large Pulse Attack. She shines bright probe pulses into the transmitter (Alice), or into the receiver (Bob) depending on the protocol, and analyses what the internal optical components reflect back; the transmitter is the certain target because that is where the key is encoded [Gisin2006]. The component that matters most is the modulator, since its setting is the key, and a system built without an internal optical modulator is immune for exactly that reason [Vakhitov2001].

A second mechanism reaches the same port without any injected light at all: the receiver's own single-photon detectors emit stray photons each time they fire, and an eavesdropper can tell from them which detector clicked [Pinheiro2018]. Vakhitov2001 places that mechanism in the same conventional-optical-eavesdropping family as this technique, alongside high-power destruction of optical components, but treats it as a separate method needing study in its own right. SQOUT carries it as its own technique, A-0080 Backflash Attack [Su2025a].

What the threat actor gains ranges from learning which bases were used, through narrowing the raw key to a few candidates, to reading the raw key outright [Vakhitov2001]. The wider lesson is that securing the quantum signals is not sufficient: the physical and optical components of the communication system, and the port they share with the channel, must be secured as well.

## Technique-Countermeasures

- CM-0013 Employment of Optical Filters <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0013>
- CM-0017 Detector Monitoring <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0017>
- CM-0008 Employment of Optical Isolation <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0008>
- CM-0006 Employing Another Quantum Protocol <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0006>
- CM-0011 Watchdog Detector <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0011>
- CM-0001 Privacy amplification <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0001>
- CM-0014 Full Device Imperfections Incorporation in Scientific Security Proof <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0014>

## Technique-Layer Mappings

- CAT-0500 Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical)
- CAT-0504 Post-Processing & Cryptographic

## Techniques Relating to This One

- A-0083 Side Channel Exploitation in Transmitter Imperfections <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0083>
- A-0080 Backflash Attack <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0080>
- A-0063 Laser Seeding Attack (LSA) <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0063>
- A-0053 External Magnetic Field Attack on Optical Isolators and Circulators <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0053>

## Literature

- [Bondar2025] Broadband optical time-domain reflectometry for quantum key distribution security analysis <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Bondar2025>
- [Gisin2006] Trojan-horse attacks on quantum-key-distribution systems <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Gisin2006>
- [Jain2014] Trojan-horse attacks threaten the security of practical quantum cryptography <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Jain2014>
- [Jain2015] Risk Analysis of Trojan-Horse Attacks on Practical Quantum Key Distribution Systems <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Jain2015>
- [Navarrete2026] Phase-error estimation for quantum key distribution with leaky receivers <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Navarrete2026>
- [Pinheiro2018] Eavesdropping and countermeasures for backflash side channel in quantum cryptography <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Pinheiro2018>
- [Su2025a] Quantifying the Upper Limit of Backflash Attack in Quantum Key Distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Su2025a>
- [Tan2025] Wide-Spectrum Security of Quantum Key Distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Tan2025>
- [Vakhitov2001] Large pulse attack as a method of conventional optical eavesdropping in quantum cryptography <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Vakhitov2001>

