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# Phase-Remapping Attack (A-0054)

Source: https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0054
Cite as: SQOUT (QuDef), https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0054, A-0054

- **QID:** A-0054
- **UUID:** f54c967b-4a93-482d-a9ef-24feea221a12
- **Type:** Quantum
- **Domain(s):** Quantum Communication
- **Tactic:** Execution
- **Updated:** 2026-11-10
- **Maturity:** Experimental

## Description

The Phase-Remapping Attack targets QKD systems that encode the key in the optical phase, and it exploits the fact that a real phase modulator is imperfect. Rather than reading the key off states already encoded and in transit, the threat actor (Eve) makes the transmitter (Alice) encode wrongly in the first place, either by time-shifting the pulses arriving at Alice so they catch the imperfect edge of her modulator's response, or by perturbing the calibration measurement so that Alice is talked into re-tuning her modulator to a setting Eve picked [Fung2007,Dong2014]. Either way Alice keeps preparing states in good faith while emitting a phase set Eve chose and can predict, which is also an integrity failure of the device and not only a secrecy failure. Eve then intercepts the mis-encoded states, tells them apart, and resends ordinary states to the receiver (Bob). Because the four states she has to distinguish sit closer together than the protocol intended, she recovers the full sifted key while introducing fewer errors than a plain intercept-and-resend attack would, below the 20% that security proofs with two-way post-processing tolerate [Xu2010,Chau2002]; a system using the one-way bound of about 11% would abort [Chau2002].

## Technique-Countermeasures

- CM-0011 Watchdog Detector <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0011>
- CM-0016 State Preparation Monitoring <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0016>
- CM-0027 Arrival Time Monitoring <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0027>
- CM-0014 Full Device Imperfections Incorporation in Scientific Security Proof <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0014>

## Technique-Layer Mappings

- CAT-0500 Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical)
- CAT-0501 Electronics & Analog Components
- CAT-0503 System Control & Orchestration

## Techniques Relating to This One

- A-0056 Partially-Random-Phase Attack <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0056>
- A-0084 Passive Faraday Mirror Attack <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0084>
- A-0057 Frequency-Shift Attack <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0057>

## Literature

- [Chau2002] Practical scheme to share a secret key through a quantum channel with a 27.6% bit error rate <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Chau2002>
- [Dong2014] An attack aimed at active phase compensation in one-way phase-encoded QKD systems <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Dong2014>
- [Fung2006] Performance of two quantum-key-distribution protocols <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Fung2006>
- [Fung2007] Phase-remapping attack in practical quantum-key-distribution systems <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Fung2007>
- [Gottesman2004] Security of quantum key distribution with imperfect devices <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Gottesman2004>
- [Qi2021] Loophole-free plug-and-play quantum key distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Qi2021>
- [Tamaki2014] Loss-tolerant quantum cryptography with imperfect sources <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Tamaki2014>
- [Xu2010] Experimental demonstration of phase-remapping attack in a practical quantum key distribution system <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Xu2010>
- [Xu2015] Experimental quantum key distribution with source flaws <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Xu2015>

