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# Non-Random Phase Attack (A-0055)

Source: https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0055
Cite as: SQOUT (QuDef), https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0055, A-0055

- **QID:** A-0055
- **UUID:** e170179e-fb7c-4d22-aac3-1252d938a04d
- **Type:** Quantum
- **Domain(s):** Quantum Communication
- **Tactic:** Execution
- **Updated:** 2026-11-10
- **Maturity:** Theoretical

## Description

The Non-Random Phase Attack is a sophisticated strategy targeting decoy-state-based QKD, e.g. BB84, protocols, where it exploits the lack of randomness in the relative phase between emitted quantum states. By discerning the global phase of quantum states, a threat actor (Eve) can perform unambiguous state discrimination (USD) measurements to differentiate signal from decoy states without disturbing the transmitted quantum information. This vulnerability opens a pathway for a photon number splitting (PNS) attack.

The recorded outcome is partial knowledge of the key: the transmitter (Alice) and receiver (Bob) accept a key Eve can partly read, while the detection statistics they monitor look normal [Tang2013a]. The bright reference pulse used in the original demonstration is a convenience rather than a requirement, since Eve can prepare her own phase reference, so any decoy-state system whose source phase is predictable is exposed [Tang2013a].

## Technique-Countermeasures

- CM-0037 Passive Phase Randomisation <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0037>
- CM-0015 Active Phase Randomisation <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0015>
- CM-0014 Full Device Imperfections Incorporation in Scientific Security Proof <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0014>

## Technique-Layer Mappings

- CAT-0500 Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical)
- CAT-0502 Firmware & Software Drivers

## Related Techniques

- A-0056 Partially-Random-Phase Attack <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0056>
- A-0067 Wavelength-Selected Photon-Number-Splitting Attack <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0067>
- A-0044 Photon-Number-Splitting (PNS) Attack <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0044>

## Techniques Relating to This One

- A-0063 Laser Seeding Attack (LSA) <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0063>

## Literature

- [BSI2023] Implementation Attacks against QKD Systems <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/BSI2023>
- [Cao2020] Discrete-phase-randomized measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Cao2020>
- [CurrasLorenzo2022] Security of quantum key distribution with imperfect phase randomisation <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/CurrasLorenzo2022>
- [Tang2013a] Source attack of decoy-state quantum key distribution using phase information <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Tang2013a>

