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# Partially-Random-Phase Attack (A-0056)

Source: https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0056
Cite as: SQOUT (QuDef), https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0056, A-0056

- **QID:** A-0056
- **UUID:** 48e3e90b-bb65-495f-9e0d-836f56919437
- **Type:** Quantum
- **Domain(s):** Quantum Communication
- **Tactic:** Execution
- **Updated:** 2026-11-12
- **Maturity:** Theoretical

## Description

The Partially-Random-Phase Attack targets two-way (plug-and-play) QKD systems, in which the receiver (Bob) sends bright pulses to the transmitter (Alice), who encodes on them and returns them attenuated. Because Alice's phase randomiser takes a finite time to settle, a threat actor (Eve) who substitutes Bob's pulses with her own and controls when they arrive can force the randomiser to act on the rising or falling edge of its response, squeezing the supposedly uniform random phase into a narrow window she chooses [Sun2012]. With the phase only partly random the outgoing pulses stop being indistinguishable, so Eve can read the encoded bit with a homodyne measurement and resend a matching state to Bob. The encoded states themselves are never altered, and by choosing a narrow enough window and a high enough decision threshold Eve can hold the error she introduces below the level at which Alice and Bob would abort, so they compute a positive key rate and share a key that is not secret [Sun2012].

## Technique-Countermeasures

- CM-0027 Arrival Time Monitoring <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0027>
- CM-0015 Active Phase Randomisation <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0015>
- CM-0011 Watchdog Detector <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0011>
- CM-0016 State Preparation Monitoring <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0016>
- CM-0014 Full Device Imperfections Incorporation in Scientific Security Proof <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0014>
- CM-0003 Decoy States Employment <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0003>
- CM-0038 Phase Modulator Triggering <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0038>

## Technique-Layer Mappings

- CAT-0500 Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical)
- CAT-0501 Electronics & Analog Components

## Related Techniques

- A-0054 Phase-Remapping Attack <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0054>
- A-0084 Passive Faraday Mirror Attack <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0084>

## Techniques Relating to This One

- A-0067 Wavelength-Selected Photon-Number-Splitting Attack <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0067>
- A-0055 Non-Random Phase Attack <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0055>

## Literature

- [BSI2023] Implementation Attacks against QKD Systems <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/BSI2023>
- [Lo2005] Decoy state quantum key distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Lo2005>
- [Lo2007] Security of quantum key distribution using weak coherent states with nonrandom phases <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Lo2007>
- [Sun2012] Partially random phase attack to the practical two-way quantum-key-distribution system <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Sun2012>
- [Sun2018] Retraction: Hacking on decoy-state quantum key distribution system with partial phase randomization <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Sun2018>

