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# Pulse-Intensity Increase in Two-Way QKD (A-0064)

Source: https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0064
Cite as: SQOUT (QuDef), https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0064, A-0064

- **QID:** A-0064
- **UUID:** 1596fa55-9a58-4a29-b119-38166da00454
- **Type:** Quantum
- **Domain(s):** Quantum Communication
- **Tactic:** Initial Access
- **Updated:** 2026-11-10
- **Maturity:** Experimental

## Description

In this attack on two-way quantum key distribution schemes, the threat actor (Eve) manipulates the intensity of the optical pulses within the system by intercepting and replacing the pulses the receiver (Bob) sends to the transmitter (Alice) with ones of higher intensity. This strategic replacement forces Alice to encode her information on these intensified pulses, inadvertently increasing the intensity of the signals she sends back to Bob, compromising the system's security.

This step takes no key material of its own. What it leaves behind is a source emitting above the level its security proof assumes, while the watchdog that should have reported the change stays silent. A separate follow-on attack, photon-number splitting or unambiguous state discrimination, is what reads the key through the door this one opens [Sajeed2015].

[Sajeed2015] models that the same manipulation also breaks quantum coin tossing on the same commercial hardware. A cheating party who can raise the mean photon number wins more often than the classical protocol allows, so the quantum version loses the advantage that was its whole point [Sajeed2015].

## Parent

- A-0063 Laser Seeding Attack (LSA) <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0063>

## Technique-Countermeasures

- CM-0011 Watchdog Detector <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0011>
- CM-0014 Full Device Imperfections Incorporation in Scientific Security Proof <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0014>

## Technique-Layer Mappings

- CAT-0500 Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical)
- CAT-0501 Electronics & Analog Components
- CAT-0505 Application & Protocol Layer

## Related Techniques

- A-0044 Photon-Number-Splitting (PNS) Attack <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0044>
- A-0045 Intercept-and-Resend Attack <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0045>

## Literature

- [BSI2023] Implementation Attacks against QKD Systems <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/BSI2023>
- [Peng2024] Security boundaries of an optical power limiter for protecting quantum key distribution systems <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Peng2024>
- [Qi2021] Loophole-free plug-and-play quantum key distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Qi2021>
- [Sajeed2015] Attacks exploiting deviation of mean photon number in quantum key distribution and coin tossing <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Sajeed2015>
- [Sushchev2025] Realistic vulnerabilities of decoy-state quantum key distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Sushchev2025>
- [Zhao2008a] Quantum key distribution with an unknown and un-trusted source <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Zhao2008a>
- [Zhao2010] Security analysis of an untrusted source for quantum key distribution: passive approach <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Zhao2010>

