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# Injection-Locking Attack (ILA) (A-0066)

Source: https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0066
Cite as: SQOUT (QuDef), https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0066, A-0066

- **QID:** A-0066
- **UUID:** f9044361-179d-4ee5-b30b-41f2ff593520
- **Type:** Quantum
- **Domain(s):** Quantum Communication
- **Tactic:** Execution
- **Updated:** 2026-11-12
- **Maturity:** Experimental

## Description

In the Injection-Locking Attack (ILA) the threat actor (Eve) sends her own laser light backwards down the quantum channel into the transmitter's (Alice's) laser source. The injected light forces Alice's laser to follow Eve's, which changes the light Alice emits in a way that depends on the setting she just chose, so Eve can read that setting from Alice's own outgoing pulses without stopping the running session [Pang2020,Zhang2022].

There are two routes: one demonstrated in the laboratory [Pang2020], one analysed from measured laser spectra and simulation [Zhang2022]. Where Alice encodes in polarisation, her own polarisation optics let Eve's light in fully only when Eve's choice matches Alice's, so a shift in Alice's emitted frequency tells Eve which polarisation Alice used [Pang2020]. Where Alice's laser has no isolator at all, which some twin-field and phase-encoded systems require by design, Eve instead switches her injection between two brightness levels and reads whether each pulse was a signal or a decoy [Zhang2022].

Either way Eve ends up holding part of the secret key, and the leftover information also opens the door to a follow-on attack such as intercept-and-resend or photon-number splitting [Pang2020,Zhang2022].

## Technique-Countermeasures

- CM-0014 Full Device Imperfections Incorporation in Scientific Security Proof <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0014>
- CM-0041 Laser Pulse-Period Control <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0041>
- CM-0012 Continuous Device Functionality Monitoring <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0012>
- CM-0016 State Preparation Monitoring <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0016>
- CM-0011 Watchdog Detector <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0011>
- CM-0040 Temperature Monitoring <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0040>
- CM-0008 Employment of Optical Isolation <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0008>

## Technique-Layer Mappings

- CAT-0500 Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical)

## Techniques Relating to This One

- A-0082 Wavelength Manipulation Attack in Free-Space <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0082>
- A-0063 Laser Seeding Attack (LSA) <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0063>

## Literature

- [Lovic2023] Quantified effects of the laser-seeding attack in quantum key distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Lovic2023>
- [Pang2020] Hacking Quantum Key Distribution via Injection Locking <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Pang2020>
- [Ponosova2022] Protecting Fiber-Optic Quantum Key Distribution Sources against Light-Injection Attacks <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Ponosova2022>
- [Ponosova2025] Pulsed laser attack at 1061 nm potentially compromises quantum key distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Ponosova2025>
- [Wiesemann2024] Evaluation of quantum key distribution systems against injection-locking attacks <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Wiesemann2024>
- [Zhang2021] Securing Practical Quantum Communication Systems with Optical Power Limiters <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Zhang2021>
- [Zhang2022] Analysis of an injection-locking-loophole attack from an external source for quantum key distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Zhang2022>

