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# Wavelength-Selected Photon-Number-Splitting Attack (A-0067)

Source: https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0067
Cite as: SQOUT (QuDef), https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0067, A-0067

- **QID:** A-0067
- **UUID:** 55266408-8a38-421f-8533-7e7b04d110c4
- **Type:** Quantum
- **Domain(s):** Quantum Communication
- **Tactic:** Execution
- **Updated:** 2026-11-10
- **Maturity:** Theoretical

## Description

The Wavelength-Selected Photon-Number-Splitting (WSPNS) attack targets quantum key distribution systems using decoy states using a two-way scheme, exploiting the properties of intensity modulators to distinguish between decoy and signal states. By timing the pulse to coincide with the intensity modulator's rising edge, the threat actor (Eve) induces a frequency shift in the pulse. This specificity allows Eve to selectively measure the wavelength of decoy pulses using wavelength division multiplexing (WDM) technology, enabling a subsequent photon number splitting (PNS) attack on the signal and decoy pulses separately without introducing errors.

Because Eve also tunes how much light she forwards so that the receiver's (Bob's) measured detection rates stay exactly as expected, nothing in the error statistics reveals the intrusion. The result is not a degraded link but a silently readable one: on longer fibre spans she recovers the entire key while the legitimate parties see a normal session [Jiang2012].

## Technique-Countermeasures

- CM-0006 Employing Another Quantum Protocol <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0006>
- CM-0027 Arrival Time Monitoring <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0027>

## Technique-Layer Mappings

- CAT-0500 Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical)
- CAT-0501 Electronics & Analog Components

## Related Techniques

- A-0056 Partially-Random-Phase Attack <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0056>
- A-0057 Frequency-Shift Attack <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0057>
- A-0044 Photon-Number-Splitting (PNS) Attack <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0044>

## Techniques Relating to This One

- A-0088 Frequency Side Channel Attack in Twin-Field QKD <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0088>
- A-0055 Non-Random Phase Attack <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0055>

## Literature

- [ETSI016PP] Quantum Key Distribution (QKD); Common Criteria Protection Profile - Pair of Prepare and Measure Quantum Key Distribution Modules <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/ETSI016PP>
- [Huang2018] Quantum key distribution with distinguishable decoy states <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Huang2018>
- [Jiang2012] Wavelength-selected photon-number-splitting attack against plug-and-play quantum key distribution systems with decoy states <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Jiang2012>
- [Jiang2025] Effect of frequency side channels on the security of practical quantum key distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Jiang2025>

