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# Double-Click Attack (A-0068)

Source: https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0068
Cite as: SQOUT (QuDef), https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0068, A-0068

- **QID:** A-0068
- **UUID:** 249d8fe1-41a0-49a2-876e-a8b35d836cfb
- **Type:** Quantum
- **Domain(s):** Quantum Communication
- **Tactic:** Execution
- **Updated:** 2026-11-10
- **Maturity:** Theoretical

## Description

The Double-click attack in quantum key distribution systems exploits simultaneous detection events in both detectors of a chosen basis at the receiver's (Bob's) end [Lutkenhaus1999,Lutkenhaus2000]. By employing an intercept-and-resend strategy with re-sent states as intense multi-photon pulses, the threat actor (Eve) can induce double-click events when Bob's basis selection is incompatible with the re-sent state. Properly leveraging these events allows Eve to gain knowledge of the key, as the double-clicks, often discarded by QKD protocols, filter out non-manipulated detection events, leaving only those controlled by Eve.

Because the events that would have exposed Eve are exactly the ones thrown away, the key material that survives carries almost no error, so she can learn it without raising the alarm that normally reveals an eavesdropper. The cited sources state the loophole [Lutkenhaus2000]; the size of the yield is inferred from the mechanism. What keeps a receiver safe is that the ambiguous rounds stay inside the security accounting, and the usual fix is a post-processing rule rather than new hardware. The receiver can assign each double click a random bit value, which is the rule the primary sources name [Lutkenhaus2000,Beaudry2008]. Since 2011 a universal squash covers essentially every protocol in scope; it discards double-click key bits and counts their rate as possible errors [Fung2011]. Or it can let the ambiguous rounds enter the disturbance calculation instead, either by weighting them [Lutkenhaus1999] or by discarding them while charging their rate against the key, as proved for prepare-and-measure protocols [Fung2011] and for an entanglement-based link [Koashi2008]. A system exposed to this attack is one that drops the ambiguous rounds without letting them affect either the key bits or the key rate.

## Technique-Countermeasures

- CM-0014 Full Device Imperfections Incorporation in Scientific Security Proof <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0014>

## Technique-Layer Mappings

- CAT-0504 Post-Processing & Cryptographic
- CAT-0500 Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical)

## Related Techniques

- A-0045 Intercept-and-Resend Attack <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0045>

## Literature

- [Beaudry2008] Squashing Models for Optical Measurements in Quantum Communication <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Beaudry2008>
- [Fung2011] Universal squash model for optical communications using linear optics and threshold detectors <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Fung2011>
- [Gittsovich2014] Squashing model for detectors and applications to quantum key distribution protocols <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Gittsovich2014>
- [Kamin2024] Improved decoy-state and flag-state squashing methods <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Kamin2024>
- [Kato2016] Security of six-state quantum key distribution protocol with threshold detectors <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Kato2016>
- [Koashi2008] Security of entanglement-based quantum key distribution with practical detectors <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Koashi2008>
- [Lutkenhaus1999] Estimates for practical quantum cryptography <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Lutkenhaus1999>
- [Lutkenhaus2000] Security against individual attacks for realistic quantum key distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Lutkenhaus2000>
- [Tsurumaru2008] Security proof for quantum-key-distribution systems with threshold detectors <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Tsurumaru2008>

