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# Detector Efficiency Mismatch Attack (A-0069)

Source: https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0069
Cite as: SQOUT (QuDef), https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0069, A-0069

- **QID:** A-0069
- **UUID:** 75e582a5-ecbe-4b48-97ad-9f3b206d805b
- **Type:** Quantum
- **Domain(s):** Quantum Communication
- **Tactic:** Execution
- **Updated:** 2026-11-18
- **Maturity:** Experimental

## Description

The Detector Efficiency Mismatch Attack exploits the differential response times and sensitivities of the detectors in a quantum key distribution system. By manipulating the timing of the pulses, the threat actor (Eve) can ensure that only one of the two detectors is active at any given moment, allowing her to control the detection events and thereby gain knowledge of the key material without detection.

Timing is only the best known of several routes. The same trick works on any parameter Eve can set that the two detectors respond to differently: the polarisation of the incoming light, its spatial mode in a free-space link, its wavelength, a tampered calibration routine, and, since 2026, the pulse energy itself [Zaitsev2026]. In the strongest case analysed, a total mismatch, Eve gets a complete copy of the key while the receiver (Bob) sees the click rate and the bit statistics he expects [Makarov2006]. The one attack run end to end leaked part of the key [Zhao2008].

## Technique-Countermeasures

- CM-0039 Bit-Mapped Gating <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0039>
- CM-0043 Detector with Random Jitter <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0043>
- CM-0086 Prior Hardware Component Study <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0086>
- CM-0061 Detector's Dead Time Management <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0061>
- CM-0046 Active Polarisation State Scrambling <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0046>
- CM-0013 Employment of Optical Filters <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0013>
- CM-0014 Full Device Imperfections Incorporation in Scientific Security Proof <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0014>

## Technique-Layer Mappings

- CAT-0503 System Control & Orchestration
- CAT-0501 Electronics & Analog Components
- CAT-0500 Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical)

## Literature

- [Bochkov2019] Security of quantum key distribution with detection-efciency mismatch in the single-photon case: Tight bounds <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Bochkov2019>
- [BSI2023] Implementation Attacks against QKD Systems <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/BSI2023>
- [Chaiwongkhot2019] Eavesdropper’s ability to attack a free-space quantum-key-distribution receiver in atmospheric turbulence <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Chaiwongkhot2019>
- [Fatin2021] Generalized efciency mismatch attack to bypass the detection-scrambling countermeasure <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Fatin2021>
- [Fei2015] Practical attacks on decoy-state quantum key systems with detector efficiency mismatch <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Fei2015>
- [Fei2018a] Exploiting wavelength-dependent beam splitter to attack the calibration of practical quantum key distribution systems <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Fei2018a>
- [Fung2009] Security proof of quantum key distribution with detection efficiency mismatch <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Fung2009>
- [Jain2011] Device Calibration Impacts Security of Quantum Key Distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Jain2011>
- [Jain2014] Trojan-horse attacks threaten the security of practical quantum cryptography <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Jain2014>
- [Liu2014] A universal setup for active control of a single-photon detector <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Liu2014>
- [Lydersen2011d] Secure gated detection scheme for quantum cryptography <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Lydersen2011d>
- [Makarov2005] Faked states attack on quantum cryptosystem <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Makarov2005>
- [Makarov2006] Effects of detector efficiency mismatch on security of quantum cryptosystems <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Makarov2006>
- [Makarov2008] Faked states attack using detector efficiency mismatch on SARG04, phase-time, DPSK, and Ekert protocols <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Makarov2008>
- [Qi2007] Time-shift attack in practical quantum cryptosystems <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Qi2007>
- [Rau2015] Spatial Mode Side Channels in Free-Space QKD Implementations <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Rau2015>
- [Sajeed2015a] Security loophole in free-space quantum key distribution due to spatial-mode detector-efficiency mismatch <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Sajeed2015a>
- [Silva2015] Safeguarding Quantum Key Distribution Through Detection Randomization <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Silva2015>
- [Taylor2026] Practical countermeasure against attacks exploiting detection-efficiency mismatch in quantum key distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Taylor2026>
- [Trushechkin2022] Security of quantum key distribution with detection- efficiency mismatch in the multiphoton case <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Trushechkin2022>
- [Wei2019] Implementation security of quantum key distribution due to polarization-dependent efficiency mismatch <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Wei2019>
- [Zaitsev2026] Energy-time attack on detectors in quantum key distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Zaitsev2026>
- [Zhang2021a] Security proof of practical quantum key distribution with detection-efficiency mismatch <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Zhang2021a>
- [Zhao2008] Quantum hacking: Experimental demonstration of time-shift attack against practical quantum-key-distribution systems <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Zhao2008>

