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# Blinding Attack with Faked States (A-0070)

Source: https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0070
Cite as: SQOUT (QuDef), https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0070, A-0070

- **QID:** A-0070
- **UUID:** 4a998fe9-666b-42f0-a5cc-7d587ade6fea
- **Type:** Quantum
- **Domain(s):** Quantum Communication
- **Tactic:** Execution
- **Updated:** 2026-11-14
- **Maturity:** Prototype

## Description

In the Blinding and Faked States Attack on quantum key distribution systems, the threat actor (Eve) uses tailored bright illumination to manipulate the receiver's (Bob's) single-photon detectors from operating in their sensitive Geiger mode to a less sensitive linear mode [Lydersen2010a]. With Bob's detectors held in linear mode, Eve performs an intercept-resend with classical faked-state pulses that force Bob's detectors to click only when his basis matches Eve's intended choice, effectively allowing Eve to control the key generation process without introducing detectable errors [Makarov2006].

Control of Bob's clicks is not the end of the attack, it is the middle. Because Alice and Bob discuss sifting, error correction and privacy amplification openly, Eve listens to that ordinary public traffic and repeats the same operations Bob performs, which hands her the identical final secret key rather than merely the raw key [Lydersen2010a,Gerhardt2011].

This entry is the family root. Detector control has been shown for all three avalanche-photodiode quench families, and a full eavesdropper has been run only against passively-quenched detectors [Gerhardt2011,Sauge2011]. The three families are passively-quenched, actively-quenched and gated, and the only thing that changes between them is the kind of bright light needed to push the detector into its classical regime [Sauge2011]. The per-family device work lives on the three child entries.

## Technique-Countermeasures

- CM-0017 Detector Monitoring <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0017>
- CM-0024 Signal Upconversion <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0024>
- CM-0011 Watchdog Detector <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0011>

## Technique-Layer Mappings

- CAT-0504 Post-Processing & Cryptographic
- CAT-0501 Electronics & Analog Components
- CAT-0500 Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical)

## Related Techniques

- A-0078 Illuminating and Faked States Attack on SNSPDs <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0078>
- A-0040 Adversary Post-Processing <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0040>

## Techniques Relating to This One

- A-0075 Detector Control by Exploiting Superlinearity <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0075>

## Literature

- [Gerhardt2011] Full-field implementation of a perfect eavesdropper on a quantum cryptography system <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Gerhardt2011>
- [Krelina2025] SQOUT: A Risk-Based Threat Analysis Framework for Quantum Communication Systems <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Krelina2025>
- [Lydersen2010a] Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Lydersen2010a>
- [Lydersen2010b] Reply to ”Avoiding the Detector Blinding Attack on Quantum Cryptography” <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Lydersen2010b>
- [Lydersen2010c] Thermal blinding of gated detectors in quantum cryptography <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Lydersen2010c>
- [Makarov2005] Faked states attack on quantum cryptosystem <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Makarov2005>
- [Makarov2006] Effects of detector efficiency mismatch on security of quantum cryptosystems <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Makarov2006>
- [Makarov2008] Faked states attack using detector efficiency mismatch on SARG04, phase-time, DPSK, and Ekert protocols <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Makarov2008>
- [Makarov2009] Controlling passively quenched single photon detectors by bright light <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Makarov2009>
- [Sauge2011] Controlling an actively-quenched single photon detector with bright light <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Sauge2011>
- [Shen2022] Countering detector manipulation attacks in quantum communication through detector self-testing <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Shen2022>
- [Yuan2010] Avoiding the blinding attack in QKD <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Yuan2010>
- [Yuan2011] Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Yuan2011>
- [Zhang2021] Securing Practical Quantum Communication Systems with Optical Power Limiters <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Zhang2021>

