> This page is from **SQOUT** by QuDef — https://sqout.qudef.com/
>
> SQOUT, by QuDef, is a security intelligence and knowledge framework for quantum technologies. Its catalogue describes attacks, vulnerabilities, countermeasures and security proofs for quantum communication and quantum computing systems.
>
> How to use and cite this content: https://sqout.qudef.com/llms.txt

# Detector Control by Exploiting Superlinearity (A-0075)

Source: https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0075
Cite as: SQOUT (QuDef), https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0075, A-0075

- **QID:** A-0075
- **UUID:** b2c2972b-2b44-4a7b-82b6-e8f1d39405ad
- **Type:** Quantum
- **Domain(s):** Quantum Communication
- **Tactic:** Execution
- **Updated:** 2026-11-10
- **Maturity:** Experimental

## Description

The Detector Control, by Exploiting Superlinearity attack, targets QKD systems by leveraging the unexpected behaviour of single-photon detectors, specifically gated Avalanche Photodiodes (APDs) and Superconducting Nanowire Single-Photon Detectors (SNSPDs), where detection efficiency anomalously increases with multiple simultaneous photon impacts. This superlinear detection window allows an attacker to manipulate detection outcomes using carefully timed faint light pulses, subtly influencing the QKD process.

Unlike the classic detector-blinding attack, which forces detectors fully into a bright-light-driven classical mode to guarantee a deterministic click, this attack works against detectors that are only moderately superlinear: the threat actor trades a fully deterministic outcome for a small, tunable increase in the error rate, so the classic blinding attack can be seen as this attack's most extreme case.

## Technique-Countermeasures

- CM-0039 Bit-Mapped Gating <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0039>
- CM-0014 Full Device Imperfections Incorporation in Scientific Security Proof <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0014>
- CM-0024 Signal Upconversion <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0024>

## Technique-Layer Mappings

- CAT-0500 Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical)
- CAT-0501 Electronics & Analog Components

## Related Techniques

- A-0074 Detector Control via After-Gate Pulses Attack <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0074>
- A-0070 Blinding Attack with Faked States <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0070>

## Literature

- [Gerhardt2011a] Experimentally Faking the Violation of Bells Inequalities <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Gerhardt2011a>
- [KoehlerSidki2019] Intrinsic Mitigation of the After-Gate Attack in Quantum Key Distribution through Fast-Gated Delayed Detection <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/KoehlerSidki2019>
- [Lydersen2010a] Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Lydersen2010a>
- [Lydersen2011b] Superlinear threshold detectors in quantum cryptography <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Lydersen2011b>
- [Qian2018] Hacking the Quantum Key Distribution System by Exploiting the Avalanche-Transition Region of Single-Photon Detectors <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Qian2018>
- [Silva2012] Real-time monitoring of single-photon detectors against eavesdropping in quantum key distribution systems <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Silva2012>
- [Wiechers2011] After-gate attack on a quantum cryptosystem <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Wiechers2011>
- [Ye2020] Quantum key distribution system against the probabilistic faint after-gate attack <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Ye2020>

