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# Blinding Attack Using Dead Time (A-0076)

Source: https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0076
Cite as: SQOUT (QuDef), https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0076, A-0076

- **QID:** A-0076
- **UUID:** de8a0a84-992f-4e06-9115-6392cab460cc
- **Type:** Quantum
- **Domain(s):** Quantum Communication
- **Tactic:** Execution
- **Updated:** 2026-11-14
- **Maturity:** Experimental

## Description

The Blinding Attack Using Dead Time exploits the inherent dead time of Avalanche Photodiodes (APDs) in QKD systems to gain knowledge of the key without needing to detect legitimate quantum signals. By selectively blinding all detectors except one during their dead time, the attacker can ascertain which detector remains active during a legitimate detection event, bypassing the need for complex faked-state strategies.

**Update ([Weier2011]):** Critically, the threat actor (Eve) never intercepts or measures Alice's photons at all: she only injects her own dim, correctly-polarised pulses into the channel and passively listens to the public sifting exchange. The legitimate photon Bob receives is measured normally by Bob's own equipment; Eve simply already knows in advance which detector was left able to register it.

## Technique-Countermeasures

- CM-0024 Signal Upconversion <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0024>
- CM-0061 Detector's Dead Time Management <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0061>

## Technique-Layer Mappings

- CAT-0500 Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical)
- CAT-0501 Electronics & Analog Components

## Techniques Relating to This One

- A-0085 Dead Time Correlation Attack <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0085>

## Literature

- [Burenkov2010] Security of high speed quantum key distribution with finite detector dead time <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Burenkov2010>
- [Gerhardt2011a] Experimentally Faking the Violation of Bells Inequalities <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Gerhardt2011a>
- [Jain2016] Upconversion-based receivers for quantum hacking-resistant quantum key distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Jain2016>
- [Qi2007] Time-shift attack in practical quantum cryptosystems <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Qi2007>
- [Rogers2007] Detector dead-time effects and paralyzability in high-speed quantum key distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Rogers2007>
- [Weier2011] Quantum eavesdropping without interception: an attack exploiting the dead time of single-photon detectors <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Weier2011>
- [Xu2006] Infuence of avalanche-photodiode dead time on the security of high-speed quantum-key distribution systems <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Xu2006>
- [Zhao2008] Quantum hacking: Experimental demonstration of time-shift attack against practical quantum-key-distribution systems <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Zhao2008>

