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# Blinding Attack on Self-Differencing APDs (A-0077)

Source: https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0077
Cite as: SQOUT (QuDef), https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0077, A-0077

- **QID:** A-0077
- **UUID:** 5048c6a6-525e-4dd4-a178-46afcc8f0274
- **Type:** Quantum
- **Domain(s):** Quantum Communication
- **Tactic:** Execution
- **Updated:** 2026-11-12
- **Maturity:** Experimental

## Description

Self-differencing single-photon detectors cancel the capacitive gating transient by subtracting the avalanche photodiode's output from a copy of itself delayed by one gate period. A threat actor (Eve) exploits that subtraction by sending light bright enough to trigger an essentially identical avalanche in every gate, so the circuit removes the real detections exactly as it removes the transient and the receiver (Bob) registers nothing [Jiang2013].

The avalanche photodiode is not driven out of its sensitive single-photon regime, which is what separates this from the better-known blinding attacks and why several of the standard detector defences do not fire. With the detector silenced, Eve intercepts the transmitter's (Alice's) states with her own copy of Bob's receiver and resends a brighter controlling pulse on top of the blinding train, which makes Bob record the bit she chose [Jiang2013,Gao2022].

She then listens to the ordinary public traffic Alice and Bob use for sifting, error correction and privacy amplification, and repeats the same steps; both sources state that this gives her the identical final key rather than merely the raw key. Both showed control of the detector in the laboratory, and neither ran the full attack on a QKD link. The calculated error rate stays where Alice and Bob expect it [Jiang2013,Gao2022].

## Technique-Countermeasures

- CM-0024 Signal Upconversion <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0024>
- CM-0039 Bit-Mapped Gating <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0039>
- CM-0086 Prior Hardware Component Study <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0086>
- CM-0014 Full Device Imperfections Incorporation in Scientific Security Proof <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0014>

## Technique-Layer Mappings

- CAT-0500 Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical)
- CAT-0501 Electronics & Analog Components

## Literature

- [Gao2022] Ability of strong-pulse illumination to hack self-differencing avalanche photodiode detectors in a high-speed quantum-key-distribution system <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Gao2022>
- [Jiang2013] Intrinsic imperfection of self-diferencing single-photon detectors harms the security of high-speed quantum cryptography systems <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Jiang2013>
- [Jiang2024] Countermeasure against blinding attack for single-photon detectors in quantum key distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Jiang2024>
- [KoehlerSidki2018] Best-Practice Criteria for Practical Security of Self-Diferencing Avalanche Photodiode Detectors in Quantum Key Distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/KoehlerSidki2018>
- [KoehlerSidki2018a] Intensity modulation as a preemptive measure against blinding of single-photon detectors based on self-differencing cancellation <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/KoehlerSidki2018a>
- [Lee2016] Countermeasure against blinding attacks on low-noise detectors with a background-noise-cancellation scheme <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Lee2016>
- [Su2025] Security analysis of orthogonal state attack on a high-speed quantum key distribution system <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Su2025>

