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# Wavelength Manipulation Attack in Free-Space (A-0082)

Source: https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0082
Cite as: SQOUT (QuDef), https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0082, A-0082

- **QID:** A-0082
- **UUID:** 64e1cc8a-9868-4860-97ec-77610c2b789c
- **Type:** Quantum
- **Domain(s):** Quantum Communication
- **Tactic:** Execution
- **Updated:** 2026-11-10
- **Maturity:** Experimental

## Description

The Wavelength Manipulation Attack in free-space Quantum Key Distribution systems involves using an external laser to alter the wavelength of the laser diodes used in state preparation. By precisely controlling the wavelength of emitted photons, the threat actor (Eve) can distinguish and decode the quantum states, gaining unauthorized access to the cryptographic key without detection.

The transmitter (Alice) encodes with one laser diode per polarisation state, each behind its own polariser, so a polarised beam that Eve sends back into Alice's output aperture heats the diodes by different amounts and separates their emission wavelengths. The polarisation Alice chose is then readable as a colour, without the polarisation itself being measured, which is why nothing in the link's error rate moves.

Eve then has two ways to finish, and they differ in what she needs. In the route demonstrated first, she reads each photon's wavelength with her own filters and detectors and sends the receiver (Bob) a matching state from her own copies of Alice's diodes, standing in for Alice on the link so that Bob cannot tell she is there. In the later route she needs no detectors at all: she tunes her beam to Alice's own operating wavelength so that it passes Alice's output filter, and that filter then blocks the diodes she has heated, leaving only the one state she chose to reach Bob. Either way she takes the publicly exchanged basis information and reconstructs the whole key [Lee2017,Lee2019].

## Technique-Countermeasures

- CM-0011 Watchdog Detector <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0011>
- CM-0056 Single Laser Diode Utilization <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0056>
- CM-0016 State Preparation Monitoring <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0016>
- CM-0040 Temperature Monitoring <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0040>
- CM-0013 Employment of Optical Filters <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0013>
- CM-0057 Wavelength Randomization <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0057>
- CM-0008 Employment of Optical Isolation <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0008>

## Technique-Layer Mappings

- CAT-0500 Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical)
- CAT-0501 Electronics & Analog Components

## Related Techniques

- A-0066 Injection-Locking Attack (ILA) <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0066>
- A-0081 Spatial Misalignment Exploitation in QKD <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0081>

## Literature

- [Fei2018] Strong light illumination on gainswitched semiconductor lasers helps the eavesdropper in practical quantum key distribution systems <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Fei2018>
- [Lee2017] Free-space QKD system hacking by wavelength control using an external laser <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Lee2017>
- [Lee2019] Quantum hacking on a free-space quantum key distribution system without measuring quantum signals <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Lee2019>
- [Rau2015] Spatial Mode Side Channels in Free-Space QKD Implementations <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Rau2015>

