> This page is from **SQOUT** by QuDef — https://sqout.qudef.com/
>
> SQOUT, by QuDef, is a security intelligence and knowledge framework for quantum technologies. Its catalogue describes attacks, vulnerabilities, countermeasures and security proofs for quantum communication and quantum computing systems.
>
> How to use and cite this content: https://sqout.qudef.com/llms.txt

# Passive Faraday Mirror Attack (A-0084)

Source: https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0084
Cite as: SQOUT (QuDef), https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0084, A-0084

- **QID:** A-0084
- **UUID:** 4440d5aa-2522-4bc9-a68f-bb2e35e7dc50
- **Type:** Quantum
- **Domain(s):** Quantum Communication
- **Tactic:** Execution
- **Updated:** 2026-11-10
- **Maturity:** Theoretical

## Description

The Passive Faraday Mirror Attack targets phase-encoded QKD systems by exploiting imperfections in Faraday mirrors (FMs), which fail to provide perfect polarization rotation. A Faraday mirror is meant to return light with its polarisation turned by exactly the right amount, and a real one is slightly off. That small error makes the transmitter (Alice) stamp its encoding choice onto the polarisation of the light as well as onto the property it meant to use, which allows the threat actor (Eve) to partially discern the polarization state of the quantum signals. On the two-way plug-and-play route she replaces the receiver (Bob) on the line, measures what the transmitter returns, sends ordinary states on to him, and thereby gains partial knowledge of the cryptographic key while causing fewer errors than a plain interception would [Sun2011].

How much this matters depends on the architecture, and the two cases differ sharply. In a two-way plug-and-play system, where the light makes a round trip through the transmitter's equipment, the attack is a live concern and gets cheaper still when run alongside the phase-remapping attack. In a one-way Faraday-Michelson system the same defect leaks, but the architecture fixes a setting the threat actor needs to vary, so the interception itself is not realizable there and what remains is a reduction of the secure key rate [Wang2013].

Two practical limits bound the whole technique. It works only on a long, lossy fibre link, because the threat actor succeeds on very few pulses and has to hide the rest inside loss the receiver already expects [Sun2011]. Neither paper ran it on hardware: both are analysis and simulation.

## Technique-Countermeasures

- CM-0014 Full Device Imperfections Incorporation in Scientific Security Proof <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0014>
- CM-0030 Quantum Device Optimal Design and TEMPEST <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0030>

## Technique-Layer Mappings

- CAT-0504 Post-Processing & Cryptographic
- CAT-0500 Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical)

## Related Techniques

- A-0054 Phase-Remapping Attack <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0054>
- A-0045 Intercept-and-Resend Attack <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0045>

## Techniques Relating to This One

- A-0056 Partially-Random-Phase Attack <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0056>

## Literature

- [ETSI011] Quantum Key Distribution (QKD); Component characterization: characterizing optical components for QKD systems <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/ETSI011>
- [Qi2021] Loophole-free plug-and-play quantum key distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Qi2021>
- [Sun2011] Passive Faraday-mirror attack in a practical two-way quantum-key-distribution system <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Sun2011>
- [Wang2013] Effect of imperfect Faraday mirrors on the security of a Faraday-Michelson quantum cryptography system <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Wang2013>

