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# Dead Time Correlation Attack (A-0085)

Source: https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0085
Cite as: SQOUT (QuDef), https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0085, A-0085

- **QID:** A-0085
- **UUID:** 17366ced-f5f6-4b2a-a4ca-bae5d9ed6538
- **Type:** Quantum
- **Domain(s):** Quantum Communication
- **Tactic:** Execution
- **Updated:** 2026-11-13
- **Maturity:** Theoretical

## Description

The Dead Time Correlation Attack lets a threat actor (Eve) read part of a QKD key without touching the quantum channel at all. Every single-photon detector is blind for a short recovery period, its dead time, after each click. When a receiver (Bob) is run faster than its own detectors can count, two detections in the same basis within one recovery period must come from that basis's two detectors in turn, because the first is still recovering while the second fires, so the two key bits they produce are opposite rather than independent [Rogers2007].

Nothing is injected, measured or altered on the quantum channel. The threat actor only listens to the ordinary public exchange in which the transmitter (Alice) and Bob agree which detections to keep, which tells her when each detection happened and in which basis. From that she reconstructs a whole alternating run of key bits and is left guessing only which detector started it, one bit however long the run is [Rogers2007]. Because she does nothing to the link, the error rate the two parties watch does not move and there is no equipment for them to find.

What triggers the attack is the transmission rate rather than the brightness of the light: a link clocked below its detectors' counting limit is not exposed, and raising the channel loss weakens the effect without removing it [Rogers2007]. How strong it gets depends on the protocol, and of those studied the two-state B92 protocol is the worst exposed [Xu2006].

## Technique-Countermeasures

- CM-0061 Detector's Dead Time Management <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0061>

## Technique-Layer Mappings

- CAT-0500 Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical)
- CAT-0504 Post-Processing & Cryptographic
- CAT-0501 Electronics & Analog Components

## Related Techniques

- A-0076 Blinding Attack Using Dead Time <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0076>
- A-0086 Timing Attack Exploiting Detector Response Times <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0086>

## Literature

- [Burenkov2010] Security of high speed quantum key distribution with finite detector dead time <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Burenkov2010>
- [Dixon2009] Ultrashort dead time of photon-counting InGaAs avalanche photodiodes <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Dixon2009>
- [Jiang2024b] High-Speed Quantum Key Distribution Using Dead-Time Compensated Detector Arrays <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Jiang2024b>
- [Krause2025] Exponential-recovery model for free-running SPADs with capacity-induced dead-time imperfections <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Krause2025>
- [Kuniyil2026] Recovery-Induced Erasure Attack on QKD Systems <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Kuniyil2026>
- [Mengler2025] Increasing the secure key rate of a quantum-key-distribution system via synchronized detector dead times <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Mengler2025>
- [Rogers2007] Detector dead-time effects and paralyzability in high-speed quantum key distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Rogers2007>
- [Souza2026] Efficiency-Resolved Recovery Dynamics of a Free-Running InGaAs/InP Single Photon Avalanche Detector Operated in Gated Mode <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Souza2026>
- [Xu2006] Infuence of avalanche-photodiode dead time on the security of high-speed quantum-key distribution systems <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Xu2006>

