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# Timing Attack Exploiting Detector Response Times (A-0086)

Source: https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0086
Cite as: SQOUT (QuDef), https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0086, A-0086

- **QID:** A-0086
- **UUID:** 2857f98a-8dee-4bb8-ab3e-d6b5fbd1e2c9
- **Type:** Quantum
- **Domain(s):** Quantum Communication
- **Tactic:** Execution
- **Updated:** 2026-11-13
- **Maturity:** Theoretical

## Description

A quantum key distribution receiver uses several single-photon detectors, and which one of them fires is what carries the secret bit. The detectors do not all answer at the same instant: each has its own small, fixed delay between the photon arriving and the detector reporting a click. Because the two parties routinely publish their detection times over the ordinary public channel so they can match their events, the published time quietly carries the identity of the detector, and with it part of the key.

The threat actor (Eve) therefore needs no access to the quantum channel at all. She listens to traffic the protocol publishes on purpose, separates the announced times into the groups belonging to each detector, and reads off part of the secret key. She sends nothing, measures no photons and adds no errors, so the transmitter (Alice) and the receiver (Bob) see a link that behaves completely normally and have no way to notice [LamasLinares2007].

The measuring paper attributes the delay differences mainly to the receiver's readout electronics, from the length of each detector's own circuit-board track and from small differences between the diodes, rather than from the optics: in the device that was measured, the optical paths to the four detectors were matched far too closely to account for the effect. The repair is to equalise the delays and to control what the system publishes [LamasLinares2007,Pahali2022].

## Technique-Countermeasures

- CM-0001 Privacy amplification <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0001>
- CM-0062 Management of Published Information In Classical Channel Communication <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0062>

## Technique-Layer Mappings

- CAT-0501 Electronics & Analog Components
- CAT-0504 Post-Processing & Cryptographic
- CAT-0500 Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical)

## Related Techniques

- A-0083 Side Channel Exploitation in Transmitter Imperfections <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0083>

## Techniques Relating to This One

- A-0085 Dead Time Correlation Attack <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0085>

## Literature

- [ETSI016PP] Quantum Key Distribution (QKD); Common Criteria Protection Profile - Pair of Prepare and Measure Quantum Key Distribution Modules <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/ETSI016PP>
- [ISOIEC23837P2] ISO/IEC DIS 23837-2:2022 Information security - Security requirements, test and evaluation methods for quantum key distribution - Part 2: Evaluation and testing methods <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/ISOIEC23837P2>
- [LamasLinares2007] Breaking a quantum key distribution system through a timing side channel <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/LamasLinares2007>
- [Nauerth2009] Information leakage via side channels in freespace BB84 quantum cryptography <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Nauerth2009>
- [Pahali2022] Cryptographic Security Concerns on Timestamp Sharing via Public Channel in Quantum Key Distribution Systems <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Pahali2022>

