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# Timing Mismatch Attack on Signal and Decoy States (A-0087)

Source: https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0087
Cite as: SQOUT (QuDef), https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0087, A-0087

- **QID:** A-0087
- **UUID:** 4e9565a7-47d0-4271-bfa0-33881aa5ac60
- **Type:** Quantum
- **Domain(s):** Quantum Communication
- **Tactic:** Execution
- **Updated:** 2026-11-10
- **Maturity:** Theoretical

## Description

The Timing Mismatch Attack exploits differences in emission timing between signal and decoy states generated by gain-switched laser diodes in QKD systems. This timing variation, arising from modulation of the laser’s pump current, allows the threat actor (Eve) to distinguish between signal and decoy states, enabling a more effective Photon Number Splitting (PNS) attack.

The same mismatch arises by a second route, between the separate laser diodes of a transmitter that gives each state its own emitter, and there it has been measured on an operational satellite link [Miller2025]. Either way the outcome is the same. The decoy-state method exists to tell the transmitter (Alice) and the receiver (Bob) how much of their key a multi-photon split could have leaked, and a threat actor who can label each pulse as signal or decoy makes that estimate wrong. The key the two parties keep is then partly known to her, and nothing in the error rate or the count rate they monitor shows it [Huang2018].

## Technique-Countermeasures

- CM-0016 State Preparation Monitoring <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0016>
- CM-0063 Employment of External Intensity Modulator <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0063>
- CM-0014 Full Device Imperfections Incorporation in Scientific Security Proof <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0014>

## Technique-Layer Mappings

- CAT-0501 Electronics & Analog Components
- CAT-0504 Post-Processing & Cryptographic
- CAT-0500 Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical)

## Related Techniques

- A-0044 Photon-Number-Splitting (PNS) Attack <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0044>

## Literature

- [Huang2018] Quantum key distribution with distinguishable decoy states <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Huang2018>
- [Miller2025] Micius, the world's first quantum communication satellite, was hackable <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Miller2025>
- [Nauerth2009] Information leakage via side channels in freespace BB84 quantum cryptography <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Nauerth2009>
- [Stehr2026] Wideband Controllable Delay Line for the Synchronization of RF Pulses in Quantum Key Distribution Sources <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Stehr2026>
- [Tamaki2016] Decoy-state quantum key distribution with a leaky source <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Tamaki2016>

