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# Wavelength-Dependent Beamsplitter Attack (A-0096)

Source: https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0096
Cite as: SQOUT (QuDef), https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0096, A-0096

- **QID:** A-0096
- **UUID:** 47313ec2-ddcc-4ad4-94a4-1bbcbb4237f1
- **Type:** Quantum
- **Domain(s):** Quantum Communication
- **Tactic:** Execution
- **Updated:** 2026-11-13
- **Maturity:** Experimental

## Description

The threat actor (Eve) exploits the wavelength dependence of the beamsplitter in the receiver's (Bob's) QKD receiver to control measurement results and obtain information about the key.

Eve intercepts each signal, measures it herself, and resends it at whichever of two wavelengths steers Bob's beamsplitter into the basis she has just used, so his basis choice stops being his own [Li2011]. The calibration-stage form of the attack, in which the receiver is made to mis-calibrate its own detectors, is catalogued under A-0129 Persistent Calibration Sabotage [Fei2018a].

The attack can yield the whole key with a strongly wavelength-dependent splitter. The link keeps reporting a normal error rate while it happens [Li2011]. The attack only works on a receiver that picks its measurement basis passively, by letting each photon choose an output port of a beamsplitter; a receiver that chooses its basis actively is not exposed [Li2011].

## Technique-Countermeasures

- CM-0086 Prior Hardware Component Study <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0086>
- CM-0011 Watchdog Detector <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0011>
- CM-0014 Full Device Imperfections Incorporation in Scientific Security Proof <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0014>
- CM-0007 Proper Implementation of Quantum Communication Protocol and QBER Estimation <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0007>

## Technique-Layer Mappings

- CAT-0500 Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical)

## Related Techniques

- A-0097 Wavelength-Dependent Beamsplitter Attack on CV-QKD <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0097>

## Literature

- [Fei2018a] Exploiting wavelength-dependent beam splitter to attack the calibration of practical quantum key distribution systems <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Fei2018a>
- [Fei2018b] Quantum man-in-the-middle attack on the calibration process of quantum key distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Fei2018b>
- [Gao2025] Spectral side channels of wavelength-division multiplexer in quantum key distribution under laser damage <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Gao2025>
- [Li2011] Attacking a practical quantum-key-distribution system with wavelength-dependent beam-splitter and multiwavelength sources <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Li2011>
- [Li2022] Security of Optical Beam Splitter in Quantum Key Distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Li2022>
- [Tan2025] Wide-Spectrum Security of Quantum Key Distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Tan2025>

