| Open Access SQOUTWavelength-Dependent Beamsplitter Attack
The threat actor (Eve) exploits the wavelength dependence of the beamsplitter in the receiver's (Bob's) QKD receiver to control measurement results and obtain information about the key.
Literature
| [Fei2018a] | Y. Fei, X. Meng, M. Gao, Z. Ma, and H. Wang. "Exploiting wavelength-dependent beam splitter to attack the calibration of practical quantum key distribution systems" In: Optik 170, 368–375. (2018) 10.1016/j.ijleo.2018.05.089. |
| [Li2011] | H. Li, S. Wang, J. Huang, W. Chen, Z. Yin, F. Li, Z. Zhou, D. Liu, Y. Zhang, G. Guo, W. Bao, and Z. Han. "Attacking a practical quantum-key-distribution system with wavelength-dependent beam-splitter and multiwavelength sources" In: Phys. Rev. A 84, 062308. (2011) 10.1103/PhysRevA.84.062308.. |
| [Li2022] | D. Li, Y. Tang, Y. Zhao, L. Zhou, Y. Zhao, and S. Tang. "Security of Optical Beam Splitter in Quantum Key Distribution" In: Photonics 9, 527. (2022) 10.3390/photonics9080527. |
Technique → Countermeasures
List of countermeasures applicable to this technique.
Items: 6
| Description | Countermeasure |
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Study beamsplitter and select the one that exhibits a low dependence [Li2022]. |
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It can be avoided effectively by applying the actively modulated phase encoding QKD systems [Li2011]. |
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Use another quantum communication protocol such as MDI or DI. |
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Using spectral monitoring at the receiver. Note that the idea is that the light of the operating wavelength is used for the quantum state decoding. The light of non-operating wavelength is separated and measured by a monitoring detector. [Li2022] |
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Using of wavelength filter. |
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Although the overall additional error rate from the attack may be low, one of the two bases will exhibit a significant error rate increase. This anomaly can trigger an error rate alert, serving as an effective countermeasure against the attack [Li2022]. |