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# Wavelength-Dependent Beamsplitter Attack on CV-QKD (A-0097)

Source: https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0097
Cite as: SQOUT (QuDef), https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0097, A-0097

- **QID:** A-0097
- **UUID:** 08cf3307-b4b4-4766-a87d-e828bbfea27a
- **Type:** Quantum
- **Domain(s):** Quantum Communication
- **Tactic:** Execution
- **Updated:** 2026-11-13
- **Maturity:** Theoretical

## Description

The threat actor (Eve) exploits the wavelength dependence of the beamsplitter in the receiver's (Bob's) Continuous-Variable (CV) QKD receiver to control measurement results and mask the noise added by an intercept-and-resend attack.

Eve stands in the line between the transmitter (Alice) and Bob, measures what Alice sends, and then sends Bob her own light at wavelengths the receiver was never designed for. At those wavelengths the splitter in front of Bob's detector no longer divides light evenly, so what Bob records is Eve's reading rather than Alice's signal, while every number Bob checks for signs of an eavesdropper still reads normal. The published analyses agree the result is the whole key rather than a fragment of it: Alice and Bob finish the protocol believing the link was secure [Huang2013,Ma2013].

The attack works against both receiver designs in use. [Huang2013] treats the heterodyne arrangement and [Huang2014] the homodyne arrangement that the commercially sold CV-QKD unit of the time actually used, so neither detection scheme protects against it on its own.

## Technique-Countermeasures

- CM-0087 Real-time Quadrature Measurements with Random Optical Attenuations <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0087>
- CM-0011 Watchdog Detector <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0011>
- CM-0086 Prior Hardware Component Study <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0086>
- CM-0088 Pattern Recognition Using Machine Learning <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0088>

## Technique-Layer Mappings

- CAT-0500 Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical)
- CAT-0501 Electronics & Analog Components
- CAT-0504 Post-Processing & Cryptographic

## Related Techniques

- A-0099 Manipulation of Vacuum-Noise Estimation <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0099>

## Techniques Relating to This One

- A-0096 Wavelength-Dependent Beamsplitter Attack <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0096>

## Literature

- [Feng2024] Underwater Wavelength Attack on Discrete Modulated Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Feng2024>
- [He2020a] Wavelength attack recognition based on machine learning optical spectrum analysis for the practical continuous-variable quantum key distribution system <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/He2020a>
- [Huang2013] Quantum hacking of a continuous-variable quantum-key-distribution system using a wavelength attack <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Huang2013>
- [Huang2014] Quantum hacking on quantum key distribution using homodyne detection <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Huang2014>
- [Jouguet2013] Preventing calibration attacks on the local oscillator in continuous-variable quantum key distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Jouguet2013>
- [Li2011] Attacking a practical quantum-key-distribution system with wavelength-dependent beam-splitter and multiwavelength sources <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Li2011>
- [Li2022] Security of Optical Beam Splitter in Quantum Key Distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Li2022>
- [Ma2013] Wavelength attack on practical continuousvariable quantum-key-distribution system with a heterodyne protocol <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Ma2013>
- [Qi2015] Generating the Local Oscillator “Locally” in Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution Based on Coherent Detection <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Qi2015>
- [Soh2015] Self-referenced continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocol <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Soh2015>
- [Tan2021] Wavelength attack on atmospheric continuous-variable quantum key distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Tan2021>

