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# Manipulation of Vacuum-Noise Estimation (A-0099)

Source: https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0099
Cite as: SQOUT (QuDef), https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0099, A-0099

- **QID:** A-0099
- **UUID:** a37a3535-3833-4d71-a4ac-883956b4f362
- **Type:** Quantum
- **Domain(s):** Quantum Communication
- **Tactic:** Execution
- **Updated:** 2026-11-13
- **Maturity:** Experimental

## Description

The threat actor (Eve) tampers with the light travelling between the transmitter (Alice) and the receiver (Bob) so that the receiver's own measurement of its noise floor comes out wrong. That floor, the shot-noise unit, is the yardstick every other measurement is compared against, so once it is wrong the receiver reports far less excess noise than is really present and the two parties conclude the link is clean when it is not [Ferenczi2007,Jouguet2013].

The attack takes no key material by itself. What it produces is a receiver whose only check on eavesdropping has been quietly disabled, so that a second attack running at the same time can read the key without raising an alarm. Alice and Bob keep generating key at a rate they believe is secure [Huang2014,Ma2013a].

There are five published ways to reach that state, and they differ in what part of the light is changed: its arrival timing, its overall brightness, the pattern of its brightness, its polarisation, or the addition of faint light at other wavelengths. Two of the five have been measured on real receiver hardware [Jouguet2013,Zhao2018]. The last is also the homodyne route of A-0097, which carries the same construction for the key it yields; this row carries it for the shot-noise estimate it corrupts [Huang2014].

## Technique-Countermeasures

- CM-0087 Real-time Quadrature Measurements with Random Optical Attenuations <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0087>
- CM-0088 Pattern Recognition Using Machine Learning <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0088>

## Technique-Layer Mappings

- CAT-0500 Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical)
- CAT-0503 System Control & Orchestration
- CAT-0504 Post-Processing & Cryptographic
- CAT-0501 Electronics & Analog Components

## Related Techniques

- A-0045 Intercept-and-Resend Attack <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0045>

## Techniques Relating to This One

- A-0097 Wavelength-Dependent Beamsplitter Attack on CV-QKD <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0097>

## Literature

- [ETSI016PP] Quantum Key Distribution (QKD); Common Criteria Protection Profile - Pair of Prepare and Measure Quantum Key Distribution Modules <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/ETSI016PP>
- [Fan2023] Quantum hacking against discrete-modulated continuous-variable quantum key distribution using modified local oscillator intensity attack with random fluctuations <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Fan2023>
- [Ferenczi2007] Calibration Attack and Defense in Continuous Variable Quantum Key Distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Ferenczi2007>
- [Haeseler2008] Testing quantum devices: Practical entanglement verifcation in bipartite optical systems <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Haeseler2008>
- [Huang2014] Quantum hacking on quantum key distribution using homodyne detection <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Huang2014>
- [ISOIEC23837P2] ISO/IEC DIS 23837-2:2022 Information security - Security requirements, test and evaluation methods for quantum key distribution - Part 2: Evaluation and testing methods <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/ISOIEC23837P2>
- [Jouguet2013] Preventing calibration attacks on the local oscillator in continuous-variable quantum key distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Jouguet2013>
- [KunzJacques2015] Robust shot-noise measurement for continuous-variable quantum key distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/KunzJacques2015>
- [Liu2017] Monitoring of continuous-variable quantum key distribution system in real environment <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Liu2017>
- [Ma2013a] Local oscillator fuctuation opens a loophole for Eve in practical continuous-variable quantum-key-distribution systems <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Ma2013a>
- [Ma2014] Enhancement of the security of a practical continuous-variable quantum-key-distribution system by manipulating the intensity of the local oscillator <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Ma2014>
- [Wu2026] Practical discrete-modulated continuous-variable quantum key distribution with one-time shot-noise unit calibration <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Wu2026>
- [Zhang2020] One-Time Shot-Noise Unit Calibration Method for Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Zhang2020>
- [Zhao2018] Polarization attack on continuous-variable quantum key distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Zhao2018>

