> This page is from **SQOUT** by QuDef — https://sqout.qudef.com/
>
> SQOUT, by QuDef, is a security intelligence and knowledge framework for quantum technologies. Its catalogue describes attacks, vulnerabilities, countermeasures and security proofs for quantum communication and quantum computing systems.
>
> How to use and cite this content: https://sqout.qudef.com/llms.txt

# Power Consumption Analysis Attack on State Preparation in QKD Systems (A-0101)

Source: https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0101
Cite as: SQOUT (QuDef), https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0101, A-0101

- **QID:** A-0101
- **UUID:** 8c9153d7-d1e6-4df5-9605-0b02c4dc2b76
- **Type:** Classical
- **Domain(s):** Quantum Communication
- **Tactic:** Execution
- **Updated:** 2026-11-13
- **Maturity:** Experimental

## Description

The threat actor (Eve) infers the quantum states prepared by the transmitter (Alice) by analysing the power consumption of the electrical circuit that drives state preparation, using machine learning [Zheng2021] or template matching [Dacosta2025] to correlate power with the transmitted states. The circuit can be an integrated electrical control circuit on a transmitter chip, which is where the attack was first analysed [Zheng2021], or a discrete electronic driver such as a field-programmable gate array board, which is where it was first measured [Dacosta2025].

What Eve walks away with is part of the key rather than all of it, a measured 73.35 percent accuracy in predicting the transmitted qubits in the demonstrated case [Dacosta2025]. The attack is invisible to the link's own checks, because it reads an electrical quantity and never touches the light, so the transmitted states, the receiver's (Bob's) measurements and the error rate the two parties estimate are all unchanged [Zheng2021]. Alice and Bob see a healthy link and claim a key that Eve already knows part of.

## Technique-Countermeasures

- CM-0070 Power Analysis Masquerading and Obscuring <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0070>
- CM-0076 Tamper Protection <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0076>
- CM-0034 Passive Quantum Communication Transmitters <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0034>

## Technique-Layer Mappings

- CAT-0500 Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical)
- CAT-0501 Electronics & Analog Components

## Related Techniques

- A-0095 Information Leakage Through Electromagnetic Radiation <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0095>

## Literature

- [BSI2023] Implementation Attacks against QKD Systems <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/BSI2023>
- [Dacosta2025] Power-consumption back door in quantum key distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Dacosta2025>
- [ETSI008] Quantum Key Distribution (QKD); QKD Module Security Specification <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/ETSI008>
- [Li2026] Security risks of VOA-induced luminescence in chip-based quantum key distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Li2026>
- [Zheng2021] Quantum Hacking on an Integrated Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution System via Power Analysis <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Zheng2021>

