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# CV Detector-Control Attack (A-0102)

Source: https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0102
Cite as: SQOUT (QuDef), https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0102, A-0102

- **QID:** A-0102
- **UUID:** b9a7831b-d5a2-4117-b101-41c5a7f58ffd
- **Type:** Quantum
- **Domain(s):** Quantum Communication
- **Tactic:** Execution
- **Updated:** 2026-11-13
- **Maturity:** Experimental

## Description

The threat actor (Eve) injects bright light into the signal port of a CV-QKD receiver (Bob) to saturate the detector electronics, masking other attacks and gaining complete knowledge of the key.

The injected light is not cancelled out, and the reason is how the receiver has to be built. Its detector balances two photodiodes against the strong reference beam it measures with, and balancing against that beam means it cannot also be balanced against the port the signal arrives on [Qin2018]. Light sent in on that port therefore shows up as a large offset, pushes the detector past the range in which its reading still tracks the input, and the readings are clipped.

Clipped readings make the link look quieter than it really is, so the safety check the transmitter and the receiver run comes out clean while the threat actor is reading every bit. They finish the protocol and accept a key she already holds in full [Qin2018].

The same route has been run against a working CV-QKD system and judged the cheaper of the two ways into the receiver's detector, and the light-injection step has since been performed against a complete CV-QKD receiver rather than a bench detector, with no transmitter present and the channel transmission assumed [Kumar2021,Pereira2026].

## Technique-Countermeasures

- CM-0088 Pattern Recognition Using Machine Learning <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0088>
- CM-0099 Variable Optical Attenuator <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0099>
- CM-0017 Detector Monitoring <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0017>
- CM-0013 Employment of Optical Filters <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0013>
- CM-0011 Watchdog Detector <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0011>
- CM-0087 Real-time Quadrature Measurements with Random Optical Attenuations <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0087>
- CM-0089 Discarding Non-linear Data Blocks <https://sqout.qudef.com/countermeasure/CM-0089>

## Technique-Layer Mappings

- CAT-0501 Electronics & Analog Components
- CAT-0500 Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical)
- CAT-0504 Post-Processing & Cryptographic

## Techniques Relating to This One

- A-0098 Saturation Attack <https://sqout.qudef.com/technique/A-0098>

## Literature

- [Gerhardt2011] Full-field implementation of a perfect eavesdropper on a quantum cryptography system <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Gerhardt2011>
- [ISOIEC23837P2] ISO/IEC DIS 23837-2:2022 Information security - Security requirements, test and evaluation methods for quantum key distribution - Part 2: Evaluation and testing methods <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/ISOIEC23837P2>
- [Kumar2021] Experimental Vulnerability Analysis of QKD Based on Attack Ratings <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Kumar2021>
- [Mao2020a] Detecting quantum attacks: a machine learning based defense strategy for practical continuous-variable quantum key distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Mao2020a>
- [Pereira2026] Experimental demonstration of a coherent detector blinding attack on a real CV-QKD system <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Pereira2026>
- [Qin2016] Quantum hacking: Saturation attack on practical continuous-variable quantum key distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Qin2016>
- [Qin2018] Homodyne-detector-blinding attack in continuous-variable quantum key distribution <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Qin2018>
- [Xu2022] Counteracting a Saturation Attack in Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution Using an Adjustable Optical Filter Embedded in Homodyne Detector <https://sqout.qudef.com/literature/Xu2022>

