| Attacking the Quantum Internet
- Takahiko Satoh, Shota Nagayama, Shigeya Suzuki, Takaaki Matsuo, Michal Hajdusek, Rodney Van Meter
- 2021
Abstract
The main service provided by the coming quantum Internet will be creating entanglement between any two quantum nodes. We discuss and classify attacks on quantum repeaters, which will serve roles similar to those of classical Internet routers. We have modeled the components for and structure of quantum repeater network nodes. With this model, we point out attack vectors, then analyze attacks in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. While we are reassured about the promises of quantum networks from the confidentiality point of view, integrity and availability present new vulnerabilities not present in classical networks and require care to handle properly. We observe that the requirements on the classical computing/networking elements affect the systems overall security risks. This component-based analysis establishes a framework for further investigation of network-wide vulnerabilities.
Note
Read for the A-0127 review, 2026-09-27, pages 9 to 13. Section V asks what an attacker can do with a hijacked node before detection. Three answers translate onto a trusted-node key relay: the node passes its health check in good faith while withholding the operation, so the network suspects an innocent neighbour (V.B.1); it can take its link down and force circuitous routes (V.B.1); and it can frame honest relays by misreporting, partitioning the network if the framed set is a graph separator (V.C.2). Scope caveat: the paper models entanglement-swapping repeaters, not trusted-node key relays, and clause VI is what licenses the translation, since it states that a repeater shares many integrity and availability vulnerabilities with a classical network system.