Initial Access
System
The threat actor is trying to get into your system.
QID:
T-0003
UUID:
524a65fc-ff4a-41c9-9128-3b390cce5915
Tier:
T0
Type:
Attack
Domain(s):
- Quantum Communication
Created:
2024-02-28
Updated:
2026-11-14
On this page
Techniques
7
| QID | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|
| A-0029 | Compromise Quantum Channel | The threat actor (Eve) may initially compromise the quantum channel in order to access the quantum communication. Once compromised, the threat actor … |
| A-0032 | Compromise and Eavesdrop Classical Channel in Quantum Systems | The threat actor (Eve) aims to access or compromise the classical communication channels used alongside quantum transmissions in quantum communicatio… |
| A-0033 | Supply Chain Compromise | Supply Chain Compromise involves the manipulation or interception of the components and processes used in the development, delivery, and maintenance … |
| A-0053 | External Magnetic Field Attack on Optical Isolators and Circulators | Optical isolators and circulators are the components a QKD transmitter (Alice) relies on to stop light entering it backwards, and they get that one-w… |
| A-0058 | Laser Damage Attack on Quantum Communication Systems | The laser damage attack employs high-power laser pulses to compromise specific components within a quantum communication system [Bugge2014]. This typ… |
| A-0063 | Laser Seeding Attack (LSA) | The Laser Seeding Attack (LSA) is a source-side attack in which the threat actor (Eve) sends light back down the quantum channel into the laser diode… |
| A-0064 | Pulse-Intensity Increase in Two-Way QKD | In this attack on two-way quantum key distribution schemes, the threat actor (Eve) manipulates the intensity of the optical pulses within the system … |
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