Collect Quantum Communication Module Information
The threat actor (Eve) may collect information on the victim's quantum communication module, which could be useful or necessary for future campaigns. This information may encompass various details such as software, firmware, post-processing techniques, quantum protocols, interfaces, electronics, optics, and more.
In the SQOUT kill-chain model this is the opening "Knowing" phase step. It takes nothing from the system and changes nothing in it, but the picture of the module that it builds is what every later phase is aimed with [Krelina2025].
| [Krelina2025] | Michal Krelina, Tom Sorger, Bob Dirks. "SQOUT: A Risk-Based Threat Analysis Framework for Quantum Communication Systems" (2025) 10.1016/j.cose.2026.105034. arXiv:2510.23462. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2026.105034. |
9dd9bc7a-df52-4496-97da-e42683b31458
- Quantum Communication
Technique properties
Operational properties
| Description | Category | Impact Type |
|---|---|---|
|
Information-collection (reconnaissance); primary impact is Operational Security (L7) — disclosure of system architecture and configuration details, matching the linked OPSEC countermeasures (CM-0071, CM-0072) [Krelina2025]. |
L7 — Operational Security | Primary Target |
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