Collect Quantum Communication Module Information

System

The threat actor (Eve) may collect information on the victim's quantum communication module, which could be useful or necessary for future campaigns. This information may encompass various details such as software, firmware, post-processing techniques, quantum protocols, interfaces, electronics, optics, and more.

In the SQOUT kill-chain model this is the opening "Knowing" phase step. It takes nothing from the system and changes nothing in it, but the picture of the module that it builds is what every later phase is aimed with [Krelina2025].

Literature 1
[Krelina2025] Michal Krelina, Tom Sorger, Bob Dirks. "SQOUT: A Risk-Based Threat Analysis Framework for Quantum Communication Systems" (2025) 10.1016/j.cose.2026.105034. arXiv:2510.23462. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2026.105034.
QID: A-0001
UUID: 9dd9bc7a-df52-4496-97da-e42683b31458
Tier: T0
Type: Classical
Domain(s):
  • Quantum Communication
Tactic: Reconnaissance
Created: 2024-01-15
Updated: 2026-11-02
Maturity: Widely Deployed
Technique properties

Attack type: Information obtaining
Target party: Receiver, Transmitter
Target function: Quantum layer, System control and management, Key management
Quantum channel: Fibre optic, Free space
Security layers: L7 — Operational Security
Maturity: Widely Deployed
Operational properties

Technique → Security Layers 1
Description Category Impact Type

Information-collection (reconnaissance); primary impact is Operational Security (L7) — disclosure of system architecture and configuration details, matching the linked OPSEC countermeasures (CM-0071, CM-0072) [Krelina2025].

L7 — Operational Security Primary Target
See Also
A-0010 Collect Quantum Channel Information
A-0013 Collect Quantum Network Information
A-0022 Acquire Infrastructure
A-0023 Compromise Infrastructure
A-0029 Compromise Quantum Channel