Collect Quantum Channel Information
The threat actor (Eve) may collect information on the victim's quantum channel, which could be useful or necessary for future campaigns. This information may encompass various details, for example, about the optic fibre or free-space channel, its properties, and more.
This is a first-step, pre-intrusion activity, and the collected details are what let the threat actor reach the link later: knowing the route and length tells them where the fibre can be reached, and knowing the loss budget tells them how much extra loss a tap could hide in. In the SQOUT kill chain this step belongs to the Knowing phase and is followed by the Entering phase, where the threat actor eavesdrops the classical channel and physically accesses the fibre [Krelina2025].
| [Krelina2025] | Michal Krelina, Tom Sorger, Bob Dirks. "SQOUT: A Risk-Based Threat Analysis Framework for Quantum Communication Systems" (2025) 10.1016/j.cose.2026.105034. arXiv:2510.23462. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2026.105034. |
b2bce17e-be9f-4194-b631-53f6929e2157
- Quantum Communication
Technique properties
Operational properties
| Description | Category | Impact Type |
|---|---|---|
|
Information-collection (reconnaissance); primary impact is Operational Security (L7) — disclosure of system architecture and configuration details, matching the linked OPSEC countermeasures (CM-0071, CM-0072) [Krelina2025]. |
L7 — Operational Security | Primary Target |
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