Collect Quantum Channel Information

System

The threat actor (Eve) may collect information on the victim's quantum channel, which could be useful or necessary for future campaigns. This information may encompass various details, for example, about the optic fibre or free-space channel, its properties, and more.

This is a first-step, pre-intrusion activity, and the collected details are what let the threat actor reach the link later: knowing the route and length tells them where the fibre can be reached, and knowing the loss budget tells them how much extra loss a tap could hide in. In the SQOUT kill chain this step belongs to the Knowing phase and is followed by the Entering phase, where the threat actor eavesdrops the classical channel and physically accesses the fibre [Krelina2025].

Literature 1
[Krelina2025] Michal Krelina, Tom Sorger, Bob Dirks. "SQOUT: A Risk-Based Threat Analysis Framework for Quantum Communication Systems" (2025) 10.1016/j.cose.2026.105034. arXiv:2510.23462. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2026.105034.
QID: A-0010
UUID: b2bce17e-be9f-4194-b631-53f6929e2157
Tier: T0
Type: Classical
Domain(s):
  • Quantum Communication
Tactic: Reconnaissance
Created: 2024-01-15
Updated: 2026-11-02
Maturity: Widely Deployed
Technique properties

Attack type: Information obtaining
Target function: Quantum layer
Quantum channel: Fibre optic, Free space
Security layers: L7 — Operational Security
Maturity: Widely Deployed
Operational properties

Technique → Security Layers 1
Description Category Impact Type

Information-collection (reconnaissance); primary impact is Operational Security (L7) — disclosure of system architecture and configuration details, matching the linked OPSEC countermeasures (CM-0071, CM-0072) [Krelina2025].

L7 — Operational Security Primary Target
See Also
A-0001 Collect Quantum Communication Module Information
A-0013 Collect Quantum Network Information
A-0022 Acquire Infrastructure
A-0023 Compromise Infrastructure
A-0029 Compromise Quantum Channel