Acquire Infrastructure
The threat actor (Eve) may buy, lease, or rent infrastructure that can be used for future campaigns or to perpetuate other techniques. A wide variety of infrastructure exists for hosting and orchestrating adversary operations.
Where the target is quantum communication, the expensive part of this acquisition is not the laser. Lasers powerful enough to deny a satellite link are commercially available and comparatively cheap, and what actually separates a capable actor from an incapable one is the tracking, targeting and intelligence apparatus needed to aim them at a specific link [Krelina2023].
| [Gozzard2021] | D. R. Gozzard, S. Walsh, and T. Weinhold. "Vulnerability of Satellite Quantum Key Distribution to Disruption from Ground-Based Lasers" In: Sensors 21, 23. (2021) 10.3390/s21237904. |
| [Krelina2023] | M. Krelina. "Quantum Communication Countermeasures" (2023) 10.48550/arXiv.2310.08728. arXiv:2310.08728. |
| [Krelina2025] | Michal Krelina, Tom Sorger, Bob Dirks. "SQOUT: A Risk-Based Threat Analysis Framework for Quantum Communication Systems" (2025) 10.1016/j.cose.2026.105034. arXiv:2510.23462. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2026.105034. |
| [Song2026] | G. Song, T. Zhu. "Stealthy Low Earth Orbit Satellite-To-Ground Quantum Communication" (2026) 10.4230/OASIcs.NINeS.2026.11. https://doi.org/10.4230/OASIcs.NINeS.2026.11. |
8f9ce54d-d932-4c6b-ab43-730fbcd85041
- Quantum Communication
Technique properties
Operational properties
| Description | Countermeasure |
|---|---|
|
A quantum threat-intelligence programme is the control that acts on adversary resource development, because it is the only one that observes the adversary rather than the victim. Its purchase on this technique is limited and the limit is the technique's own economics: [Krelina2023] finds that the prerequisites for a laser weapon in this context are relatively undemanding in terms of required power and that commercially available lasers could be employed, so acquiring one is largely indistinguishable from legitimate commercial activity and offers little for intelligence to detect. What is discriminable is the other half of the acquisition, the tracking, targeting and intelligence apparatus that [Krelina2023] identifies as the pivotal parameter in discerning potential malicious actors. A programme aimed at this technique should therefore watch for the assembly of targeting capability rather than for laser procurement. |
CM-0074 Quantum Threat Intelligence Program |
| Description | Category | Impact Type |
|---|---|---|
|
Operational Security (L7) — acquiring infrastructure to stage later operations is operational-layer adversary tradecraft conducted before intrusion, matching the linked operational countermeasure CM-0074 (Quantum Threat Intelligence Program) [Krelina2025]. |
L7 — Operational Security | Primary Target |
|
Physical Layer / Quantum & Optical (L1) — secondary mapping. The acquisition act itself is operational tradecraft (L7 remains the primary mapping); however, the infrastructure acquired here is destined to disrupt the physical/optical layer, namely free-space optical QKD links via jamming. SQOUT places free-space jamming at the physical layer, making this resource-development step an upstream precursor to a physical-layer denial-of-service [Krelina2025]. |
L1 — Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical) | Secondary Effect |
| Relation type | Description | Technique |
|---|---|---|
| Precedes |
This acquisition step precedes the Denial technique that consumes its output. The laser weapon system, tracking and targeting capability and deployment platform acquired here are exactly the equipment A-0047 requires, and both rows draw that inventory from [Krelina2023]. |
A-0047 Denial |
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