Compromise Infrastructure
The threat actor (Eve) may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used for future campaigns or to perpetuate other techniques. By using compromised infrastructure, Eve may make it difficult to tie their actions back to them.
This is staging and obfuscation, and it happens entirely outside the target's deployment. The hosts and networks taken here belong to unrelated third parties; the victim's own infrastructure is untouched, and nothing about the victim's configuration, key material or error rates changes. What the step produces is a launch point and attribution cover, which is why it is catalogued as resource development rather than as an attack. The framework paper places the cyber tooling of this phase before the point at which the adversary begins compromising system components [Krelina2025].
Compromising an element inside the target network — a trusted relay or repeater, a QKD network controller, a key manager — is a different technique on a different phase, and is catalogued as [A-0135] Trusted Node / Relay Compromise, with [A-0131] and [A-0134] for the control plane and the key management system.
| [Krelina2025] | Michal Krelina, Tom Sorger, Bob Dirks. "SQOUT: A Risk-Based Threat Analysis Framework for Quantum Communication Systems" (2025) 10.1016/j.cose.2026.105034. arXiv:2510.23462. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2026.105034. |
5d6917a7-0859-4772-8ce3-ffa3ba08aaf5
- Quantum Communication
Technique properties
Operational properties
| Description | Countermeasure |
|---|---|
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Quantum Threat Intelligence Program (CM-0074). A threat-intelligence programme gives warning that this class of preparation happens, rather than detection of an instance of it. Its value here is the enumeration duty: recording, per technique, the description, the indicators of compromise and the countermeasures [Krelina2025], so that an operator who later sees a known staging host in its logs can place it in a kill chain. Effectiveness is low, because the compromise happens on third-party infrastructure before any intrusion, where the operator has no telemetry of its own. |
CM-0074 Quantum Threat Intelligence Program |
| Description | Category | Impact Type |
|---|---|---|
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Operational Security (L7) — compromising third-party infrastructure to stage later operations is operational-layer adversary tradecraft (supply-chain / deployment attack phase) rather than a direct attack on a QKD system layer [Krelina2025]. |
L7 — Operational Security | Primary Target |
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