Compromise and Eavesdrop Classical Channel in Quantum Systems

System

The threat actor (Eve) aims to access or compromise the classical communication channels used alongside quantum transmissions in quantum communication systems, exploiting these channels to perform own quantum attack.

Note that in QKD the classical channel is public by design; the security-critical target is its authentication and integrity rather than its secrecy, because all key-agreement protocols are insecure over non-authentic channels and a man-in-the-middle on an unauthenticated or weakly authenticated classical channel can compromise the entire key [Pacher2016].

Literature 5
[Giestinhas2025] J. A. V. Giestinhas, T. Spiller. "On Post-Quantum Cryptography Authentication for Quantum Key Distribution" (2025) 10.48550/arXiv.2507.21325. arXiv:2507.21325. http://arxiv.org/abs/2507.21325.
[ITUX1710] ITU-T. "ITU-T X.1710: Security framework for quantum key distribution networks". (2020) https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.1710-202010-I/en.
[Krelina2025] Michal Krelina, Tom Sorger, Bob Dirks. "SQOUT: A Risk-Based Threat Analysis Framework for Quantum Communication Systems" (2025) 10.1016/j.cose.2026.105034. arXiv:2510.23462. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2026.105034.
[Nikolopoulos2023] G. M. Nikolopoulos, M. Fischlin. "Quantum key distribution with post-processing driven by physical unclonable functions" (2023) 10.48550/arXiv.2302.07623. arXiv:2302.07623. http://arxiv.org/abs/2302.07623.
[Pacher2016] C. Pacher, A. Abidin, T. Lorünser, M. Peev, R. Ursin, A. Zeilinger, J.-Å. Larsson. "Attacks on quantum key distribution protocols that employ non-ITS authentication" (2016) 10.1007/s11128-015-1160-4. arXiv:1209.0365.
QID: A-0032
UUID: 06a139c8-4de7-4b52-b426-6f056f46a584
Tier: T0
Type: Classical
Domain(s):
  • Quantum Communication
Tactic: Initial Access
Created: 2024-01-17
Updated: 2026-11-13
Maturity: Theoretical
Technique properties

Attack type: Door opener/Lowering security, Information obtaining
Target party: Receiver, Transmitter
Target function: System control and management, Key management
Quantum channel: Fibre optic, Free space
Security layers: L4 — System Control & Orchestration L5 — Post-Processing & Cryptographic L6 — Application & Protocol Layer L7 — Operational Security
Maturity: Theoretical
Operational properties

Technique → Countermeasures 1
Description Countermeasure

Encrypting the classical channel end to end raises the cost of passive reading and, in an authenticated-encryption mode, supplies the message integrity this technique attacks. In a confidentiality-only mode it supplies none of what is missing, because the QKD security model already treats the classical channel as public and the security-critical property is authenticity rather than secrecy [Pacher2016].

CM-0077 End-to-End Encryption for Classical Channels in Quantum Communication Systems
Technique → Security Layers 4
Description Category Impact Type

Post-Processing & Cryptographic layer: the attack targets the authentication/integrity of the classical post-processing exchange (sifting, reconciliation, confirmation, key management). Pacher2016 explicitly addresses non-ITS authentication in QKD post-processing [Pacher2016].

L5 — Post-Processing & Cryptographic Primary Target

System Control & Orchestration layer: the classical channel is the control/orchestration channel between transmitter (Alice) and receiver (Bob), carrying basis-sifting and protocol-control messages; compromising it disrupts orchestration in addition to the cryptographic post-processing [Pacher2016].

L4 — System Control & Orchestration Secondary Effect

Application and Protocol layer. The element attacked here is the message-authentication step of the QKD post-processing protocol, which is where a substituted sifting or reconciliation message is accepted as genuine or rejected. Krelina2025 places man-in-the-middle at the protocol layer of its target-system-layer axis [Krelina2025], and Pacher2016 attacks that step directly, showing that a message colliding with an intercepted one under the code's public inner hash carries a valid tag under every key [Pacher2016]. impact_type is primary because the protocol's accept-or-reject decision is what the technique subverts, alongside the cryptographic layer mapped separately.

L6 — Application & Protocol Layer Primary Target

Operational Security, as a secondary effect. Two of the entity's own access routes run through people and process rather than through technology: social engineering to obtain credentials or access to the communication infrastructure, and the operator-controlled knowledge of which authentication scheme a deployment runs, which this row records as the reconnaissance the technique needs [Krelina2025].

L7 — Operational Security Secondary Effect
Related Techniques 1
Relation type Description Technique
Precedes

The second and more common thing this foothold is used for. Where the deployment's authentication is sound, the classical traffic is still readable by design, and recording the sifting and reconciliation messages is what lets a threat actor mirror the legitimate post-processing and reduce her own raw outcomes to the same distilled key. Both worked kill chains in Krelina2025 use this step this way and follow it with post-processing in the Exploiting phase, which SQOUT carries as A-0040 [Krelina2025].

A-0040 Adversary Post-Processing
Techniques Relating to This One 2
Relation type Description Technique
Combines with

Channel access and classical-channel eavesdropping (A-0032) are paired in practice. The framework lists both as the actions of the Entering phase, and in its detector-blinding kill chain the classical eavesdrop directly follows the fibre tap [Krelina2025]. The 2026 penetration rig did both from one apparatus: it adjusted the length of the quantum channel and wiretapped the classical channel [Huang2026]. Together they set up the follow-on attack that extracts the key.

A-0029 Compromise Quantum Channel
Preceded by

Krelina2025 places eavesdropping on the classical channel used in the quantum communication system in the Entering phase, immediately after the Knowing phase this technique belongs to [Krelina2025]. Knowing which classical link carries control and post-processing traffic, and how it is secured, is what makes A-0032 targetable rather than speculative. Note the paper states an ordering between phases rather than between individual techniques; this technique-level edge is drawn because this technique's specific product, the identification of the classical channels and their security, is the input that step consumes.

A-0013 Collect Quantum Network Information
See Also
A-0023 Compromise Infrastructure
A-0029 Compromise Quantum Channel
A-0033 Supply Chain Compromise
A-0037 Non-Kinetic Physical Attack
A-0038 Direct Physical Attack