Supply Chain Compromise

System

Supply Chain Compromise involves the manipulation or interception of the components and processes used in the development, delivery, and maintenance of quantum systems, threatening the integrity and security of both their quantum and classical components.

The threat actor (Eve) does not break the physics of the quantum link. They arrange for the transmitter (Alice), the receiver (Bob), or the classical equipment that supports them to arrive already compromised, so the operator installs and trusts a device the attacker controls. Nothing is taken at this step. What it produces is a component a later attack can use, which is why supply-chain compromise counts as a door opener rather than as key theft. 

Literature 7
[Curty2019] M. Curty and H. Lo. "Foiling covert channels and malicious classical post-processing units in quantum key distribution" In: npj Quantum Information 5, 14. (2019) 10.1038/s41534-019-0131-5.
[ETSI008] ETSI. "Quantum Key Distribution (QKD); QKD Module Security Specification". (2010) https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_gs/QKD/001_099/008/01.01.01_60/gs_QKD008v010101p.pdf.
[ETSI016PP] ETSI. "Quantum Key Distribution (QKD); Common Criteria Protection Profile - Pair of Prepare and Measure Quantum Key Distribution Modules". In: ETSI GS QKD 016. (2024) https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_gs/QKD/001_099/016/02.01.01_60/gs_QKD016v020101p.pdf.
[Krelina2025] Michal Krelina, Tom Sorger, Bob Dirks. "SQOUT: A Risk-Based Threat Analysis Framework for Quantum Communication Systems" (2025) 10.1016/j.cose.2026.105034. arXiv:2510.23462. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2026.105034.
[Li2021] W. Li, V. Zapatero, H. Tan, K. Wei, H. Min, W. Liu, X. Jiang, S. Liao, C. Peng, M. Curty, F. Xu, and J. Pan. "Experimental quantum key distribution secure against malicious devices" In: Phys. Rev. Appl. 15, 034081. (2021) 10.1103/PhysRevApplied.15.034081.
[Sajeed2021] Shihan Sajeed, Poompong Chaiwongkhot, Anqi Huang, Hao Qin, Vladimir Egorov, Anton Kozubov, Andrei Gaidash, Vladimir Chistiakov, Artur Vasiliev, Artur Gleim, Vadim Makarov. "An approach for security evaluation and certification of a complete quantum communication system" (2021) 10.1038/s41598-021-84139-3.
[Zapatero2021] V. Zapatero and M. Curty. "Secure quantum key distribution with a subset of malicious devices" In: npj Quantum Information 7, 26. (2021) 10.1038/s41534-020-00358-y.
QID: A-0033
UUID: eda3450b-3f2f-4a60-9d44-6bcaa5422a72
Tier: T0
Type: Classical
Domain(s):
  • Quantum Communication
Tactic: Initial Access
Created: 2024-01-17
Updated: 2026-11-12
Maturity: Theoretical
Technique properties

Attack type: Door opener/Lowering security, Manipulation/Tampering
Target party: Receiver, Transmitter
Target function: System control and management, Key management
Quantum channel: Fibre optic, Free space
Security layers: L1 — Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical) L2 — Electronics & Analog Components L3 — Firmware & Software Drivers L4 — System Control & Orchestration L5 — Post-Processing & Cryptographic L7 — Operational Security
Maturity: Theoretical
Operational properties

Technique → Countermeasures 2
Description Countermeasure

Splitting the secret with verifiable secret sharing, so a compromised module or post-processing unit holds only a share and cannot reconstruct the key alone. [Curty2019] pairs it with multi-vendor redundancy as the remedy for malicious classical post-processing units, on the basis that verifiable secret sharing allows a dealer to split a message between several parties such that only authorised groups of parties can collaborate and reconstruct it. Security is proved under a bounded number of corrupted parties, not unconditionally.

CM-0066 Use of Verifiable Secret Sharing and Privacy Amplification Techniques

Physical tamper protection acts on the delivery and in-service stages of this technique. The module security specification requires the documentation to specify the procedures for maintaining security while distributing and delivering a QKD module to authorised operators, and separately that those procedures shall specify how to detect tamper during that delivery [ETSI008], which is exactly the substitution-in-transit route this row covers and which the primary source places in its deployment phase alongside intercepting shipments [Krelina2025]. It does nothing about an implant placed before the enclosure is sealed, which is the foundry and packaging route [Curty2019].

CM-0076 Tamper Protection
Technique → Security Layers 6
Description Category Impact Type

Operational Security is the primary layer: supply-chain integrity (procurement, vendor management, logistics) is an operational concern, classified as an operational-factor risk in [Krelina2025]. The technique's existing countermeasures — supplier review, secure development environment, tamper protection and vulnerability scanning — are all operational controls.

L7 — Operational Security Primary Target

Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical) is a secondary target: counterfeit or trojaned hardware components — optical sources, detectors and other physical-layer parts — are inserted via the supply chain [Krelina2025].

L1 — Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical) Secondary Effect

Firmware & Software Drivers is a secondary target: firmware tampering during the supply-chain phase embeds malicious code in device firmware and drivers [Krelina2025].

L3 — Firmware & Software Drivers Secondary Effect

Electronics and Analog Components is reached because that layer is the electronic signal processing and conditioning between firmware or software and the electro-optical devices, which is exactly where a trojaned FPGA, ASIC or analog part lands [Sajeed2021]. The implant is invisible at this layer by design, since a hardware trojan can be a slight adjustment to the electrical properties of a few transistors out of the billions on a chip [Curty2019].

L2 — Electronics & Analog Components Secondary Effect

System Control and Orchestration is reached because Krelina2025 names control software and synchronisation among the targets of classical-dominant attacks [Krelina2025], and the layer model defines the state machine that decides when to run subsystems in different regimes as its own layer [Sajeed2021]. A compromised orchestration component gives the threat actor covert control over that schedule, which is the knock-on effect the hardware child A-0036 already records at this layer.

L4 — System Control & Orchestration Secondary Effect

Post-Processing and Cryptographic is reached because another key weakness in standard QKD security proofs is that they all implicitly assume that the classical post-processing units are trusted [Curty2019], and those units are where sifting, parameter estimation, error correction, error verification and privacy amplification happen [Curty2019]. The layer model places preparation and storage of raw key data, sifting, error correction, privacy amplification and authentication at this layer [Sajeed2021], and Krelina2025 names authentication and key management among the targets of classical-dominant attacks [Krelina2025]. It is the layer at which the key first exists as a copyable classical object.

L5 — Post-Processing & Cryptographic Secondary Effect
See Also
A-0029 Compromise Quantum Channel
A-0032 Compromise and Eavesdrop Classical Channel in Quantum Systems
A-0037 Non-Kinetic Physical Attack
A-0038 Direct Physical Attack
A-0039 Quantum Channel Dazzling