Denial

System

Denial is the family of techniques in which the threat actor (Eve) stops a quantum-communication service from working, and takes nothing from it. For a quantum key distribution link, the most studied case, that means the link stops producing key. The transmitter (Alice) and the receiver (Bob) are left either with no link at all or with a link that is up and useless. The family's founding source defines its own subject as "various actions leading to temporary or permanent denial of quantum communication service, or its significant slowing down" [Krelina2023], and every route catalogued under this parent sits in the reversible band of that definition. Of dazzling, the lowest-power band, the same source says "it has no permanent effect" [Krelina2023]. Nothing is stolen and nothing is broken: all twelve children record a reversible effect, so the service returns when the attack stops.

 

Literature 30
[Burdiak2023] "Use-Case Denial of Service Attack on Actual Quantum Key Distribution Nodes" (2023) 10.5220/0011672000003405.
[Cheng2025] "Large-Scale FPGA-Based Privacy Amplification Exceeding 10^8 Bits for Quantum Key Distribution" (2025) 10.48550/arXiv.2503.09331. arXiv:2503.09331.
[Daschner2019] Daschner, Robert; Kelly, Ryan; Sharpe, Zachary; Yang, Sean; Smith, Andrew M.. "Exploiting Faraday Rotation to Jam Quantum Key Distribution via Polarized Photons" (2019) 10.26421/QIC19.15-16. arXiv:1905.01359.
[Dervisevic2022] "Simulations of Denial of Service Attacks in Quantum Key Distribution Networks" (2022) 10.1109/ICAT54566.2022.9811238.
[ETSI014] ETSI. "ETSI GS QKD 014 V1.1.1: Quantum Key Distribution (QKD); Protocol and data format of REST-based key delivery API". (2019) https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_gs/QKD/001_099/014/01.01.01_60/gs_QKD014v010101p.pdf.
[Gansel2025] Antoine Gansel, Juliane Kramer, Tim Schumacher, Patrick Struck, Maximilian Tippmann, Thomas Walther. "Field-Tested Authentication for Quantum Key Distribution and DoS Attacks" (2025) 10.1007/978-3-032-01799-4_14. https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1247.
[Gozzard2021] D. R. Gozzard, S. Walsh, and T. Weinhold. "Vulnerability of Satellite Quantum Key Distribution to Disruption from Ground-Based Lasers" In: Sensors 21, 23. (2021) 10.3390/s21237904.
[ITUX1710] ITU-T. "ITU-T X.1710: Security framework for quantum key distribution networks". (2020) https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.1710-202010-I/en.
[ITUX1712] ITU-T. "ITU-T X.1712: Security requirements and measures for quantum key distribution networks - key management". (2021) https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.1712/en. Read in full for the A-0127 review, 2026-09-27, as the Corrigendum 1 complete-text publication. Names deletion-or-corruption and denial of service on the key-management-agent link as first-class threats (clause 8.1), requires per-hop and endpoint integrity verification of key data (Table 1, SReq.7 to SReq.9), makes rerouting under the QKDN controller the availability measure (Table 1, SReq.12), and puts insider attacks against the key manager outside its own scope (clause 8, NOTE 2)..
[ITUY3804] ITU-T. "ITU-T Y.3804: Quantum key distribution networks - Control and management". (2020) http://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/14409.
[ITUY3815] ITU-T. "ITU-T Y.3815: Quantum key distribution networks - Overview of resilience". (2023)
[ITUY3821] ITU-T. "ITU-T Y.3821: Quantum key distribution networks - Requirements for resilience". (2024)
[ITUY3830] ITU-T. "ITU-T Y.3830: Quantum key distribution networks - Procedures for key supply protection and recovery for resilience". (2025)
[ITUY3833] ITU-T. "ITU-T Y.3833: Quantum key distribution networks - Dependability assessment". (2025)
[ITUYSup89] ITU-T. "ITU-T Y.3800-series Supplement 89 (03/2025), Analysis of synchronization in quantum key distribution networks". (2025) https://www.itu.int/pub/T-SUP-Y.SUP89-2025.
[Kish2024] S. P. Kish, C. Thapa, M. Sayat, H. Suzuki, J. Pieprzyk, S. Camtepe. "Mitigation of Channel Tampering Attacks in Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution" (2024) 10.1103/PhysRevResearch.6.023301. arXiv:2401.15898.
[Krelina2023] M. Krelina. "Quantum Communication Countermeasures" (2023) 10.48550/arXiv.2310.08728. arXiv:2310.08728.
[Krelina2025] Michal Krelina, Tom Sorger, Bob Dirks. "SQOUT: A Risk-Based Threat Analysis Framework for Quantum Communication Systems" (2025) 10.1016/j.cose.2026.105034. arXiv:2510.23462. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2026.105034.
[Lloyd2026] Zachary Lloyd, Mengjun Xie. "Risk Assessment of a Hypothetical Quantum Repeater Network Using SP 800-30 and the CIA Triad" (2026) 10.1145/3746467.3801533.
[Millet2026] Millet, C. et al. (ID Quantique SA and University of Geneva). "Analytical Model of Clock Drift in Quantum Key Distribution and a Simple Synchronization Algorithm" (2026) 10.48550/arXiv.2605.26705. arXiv:2605.26705.
[Pirandola2017] S. Pirandola, R. Laurenza, C. Ottaviani, L. Banchi. "Fundamental limits of repeaterless quantum communications" (2017) 10.1038/ncomms15043. arXiv:1510.08863.
[Pljonkin2021] Pljonkin, A.; Petrov, D.; Sabantina, L.; Dakhkilgova, K.. "Nonclassical Attack on a Quantum Key Distribution System" (2021) 10.3390/e23050509. Read for this review from a text rendering of the Europe PMC full-text XML of PMC8146243 (CC BY 4.0), because MDPI, PMC and Europe PMC all refuse scripted PDF fetches. The rendering has no journal pagination, so citations locate by section rather than page..
[Popp2024] Alexandra Popp, Florian Sedlmeir, Birgit Stiller, Christoph Marquardt. "Eavesdropper localization for quantum and classical channels via nonlinear scattering" In: Optica Quantum 2(1), 21-28 (2024). (2024) 10.1364/OPTICAQ.502944. arXiv:2306.14341.
[Price2020] Alasdair B. Price, John G. Rarity, Chris Erven. "A quantum key distribution protocol for rapid denial of service detection" (2020) 10.1140/epjqt/s40507-020-00084-6.
[Satoh2021] Takahiko Satoh, Shota Nagayama, Shigeya Suzuki, Takaaki Matsuo, Michal Hajdusek, Rodney Van Meter. "Attacking the Quantum Internet" (2021) 10.1109/TQE.2021.3094983. Read for the A-0127 review, 2026-09-27, pages 9 to 13. Section V asks what an attacker can do with a hijacked node before detection. Three answers translate onto a trusted-node key relay: the node passes its health check in good faith while withholding the operation, so the network suspects an innocent neighbour (V.B.1); it can take its link down and force circuitous routes (V.B.1); and it can frame honest relays by misreporting, partitioning the network if the framed set is a graph separator (V.C.2). Scope caveat: the paper models entanglement-swapping repeaters, not trusted-node key relays, and clause VI is what licenses the translation, since it states that a repeater shares many integrity and availability vulnerabilities with a classical network system..
[Scarani2009] V. Scarani, H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci, N. J. Cerf, M. Dusek, N. Lutkenhaus, M. Peev. "The security of practical quantum key distribution" (2009) 10.1103/RevModPhys.81.1301. arXiv:0802.4155.
[Simmons2023] Cameron Simmons, Yoann Noblet, Alfonso Tello Castillo, Ross Donaldson. "An investigation of jamming in free-space quantum key distribution" In: Proc. SPIE 12335, Quantum Technology - Driving Commercialisation of an Enabling Science III, 123350C (11 January 2023). (2023) 10.1117/12.2644866.
[Song2026] G. Song, T. Zhu. "Stealthy Low Earth Orbit Satellite-To-Ground Quantum Communication" (2026) 10.4230/OASIcs.NINeS.2026.11. https://doi.org/10.4230/OASIcs.NINeS.2026.11.
[Weier2011] H. Weier, H. Krauss, M. Rau, M. Fürst, S. Nauerth, and H. Weinfurter. "Quantum eavesdropping without interception: an attack exploiting the dead time of single-photon detectors" In: New Journal of Physics 13, 073024. (2011) 10.1088/1367-2630/13/7/073024.
[Yin2023] Wenhao Yin, Yuhan Zhou, Duan Huang. "Denial-of-Service Attack Defense Strategy for Continuous Variable Quantum Key Distribution via Deep Learning" (2023) 10.3390/math11122681.
QID: A-0047
UUID: 1d5ed0e2-2dca-4969-85e8-fdc38f5d6ba5
Tier: T0
Type: Hybrid
Domain(s):
  • Quantum Communication
Tactic: Impact
Created: 2024-01-19
Updated: 2026-11-13
Maturity: Experimental
Technique properties

Attack type: Denial of service, Degradation
Target party: Receiver, Transmitter
Target function: Quantum layer, System control and management, Key management
Quantum channel: Fibre optic, Free space
Security layers: L1 — Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical) L4 — System Control & Orchestration L5 — Post-Processing & Cryptographic L7 — Operational Security
Maturity: Experimental
Operational properties

Technique → Countermeasures 1
Description Countermeasure

Rerouting is the availability control for denial of a quantum network: when a node or link is denied, the session moves to a backup path rather than the attack being prevented. [Krelina2023] lists it as a counter-countermeasure, describing it as a natural mitigation strategy involving switching to backup Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) links or rerouting the quantum connection, while warning that it can be particularly challenging in the early stages of quantum networks, where redundancy is minimal, and rerouting consumes substantial resources. [Song2026] gives the satellite instantiation and the first quantitative result for it, pre-associating each entanglement session with multiple candidate satellites having overlapping visibility windows so that failover requires no real-time path calculation, and reassigning the session to a backup satellite on an anomalous error reading. Because each attack disrupts only one session, the threat actor (Eve) must compromise all quantum-enabled satellites simultaneously to stop key distribution, and the simulated improvement in cumulative key generation ranges from 35.8% at 250 eavesdropping attempts to 90.2% at 1500. A mega-constellation therefore supplies exactly the redundancy [Krelina2023] identifies as missing in early networks, so the control's value scales with network density.

The ITU-T QKDN resilience series adds three points.

It is two controls, not one. Protection allocates backup QKD modules, links or key relay routes before a failure occurs, and recovery computes a new route after it: the key relay route for protection is pre-set, while the key relay route for recovery can be automatically calculated [ITUY3815]. The distinction is operational rather than terminological, because a pre-set protection switch is fast and a computed recovery is not, and recovery carries its own deadline, since a QKDN controller is recommended to recalculate the key relay route for recovery within the toleration time of the cryptographic application [ITUY3821]. An attacker aiming to exceed that toleration time has a target the prose above does not name.

Redundancy on the same fibre is not redundancy. A protection QKD link is recommended to be deployed in separate optical fibre from the working QKD link [ITUY3821]. Where it is not, one act on that fibre takes both, and this family contains a child, A-0118, whose whole mechanism is one such act.

The standard names what defeats the control outright. Coordinated protection across the quantum and key-management layers is the last resort when the quantum layer has no protection component available, and if the failure of QKD modules and/or links affects all routes involved in key relay, including protection relay routes, the coordinated protection cannot be applied [ITUY3830]. That is the normative form of the limit [Krelina2023] reaches from the attacker's side, and it names the defeating behaviour precisely: not attacking harder, but attacking widely enough to take the backup path with the working one.

CM-0085 Quantum Network Traffic Rerouting
Technique → Security Layers 4
Description Category Impact Type

Operational Security is a prerequisite layer for this family rather than a target of it, and five children map it: A-0039, A-0118, A-0120, A-0123 and A-0127. Two controls live there and both are named by the parent's own source as counter-countermeasures in their own right: keeping route and asset locations unknown, since [Krelina2023] states that knowledge of the locations of fibre optic cables, ground optical stations, or the trajectories of quantum satellites is crucial for a successful attack and that keeping such information classified and unknown is therefore imperative, and physical protection of the route and the sites at either end. Where both hold, the four quantum-layer routes that map this layer do not start, A-0039, A-0118, A-0120 and A-0123, and the fifth, A-0127, loses the relay its adversary has to hold. The same source makes the point quantitatively by naming target acquisition as the foremost challenge the attacker faces, ahead of any optical or electronic difficulty. The layer does not reach the other four classical children, A-0124, A-0125, A-0126 and A-0130, because none of them needs location knowledge at all and A-0126's adversary is already inside the site boundary; nor does it reach A-0119, A-0121 or A-0122, which map no operational-security layer of their own.

L7 — Operational Security Prerequisite for Attack

System Control & Orchestration is a secondary target: denial of the classical command-and-control link and of quantum-network service (routing manipulation, costly rerouting in low-density networks) [Krelina2023].

This layer is not only where some of the damage lands, it is where the family's effects are read and acted on, and that reading matters most.

The automation is driven by exactly the two quantities this family moves. The routing control function also performs the rerouting of key relay depending on the status of the key management layer and/or the quantum layer, ensuring the continued operation of the key supply/key relay [ITUY3804], and it fires on two conditions and only two: a quantum bit error rate increasing beyond a threshold in a certain QKD link connected to the relay node, and the residual amount of keys in the KM(s) in the relay node(s) running short below a threshold [ITUY3804]. Those two conditions partition exactly onto this family's two halves, the error-rate children producing the first and the key-exhaustion children producing the second.

And the control plane reads the first of them as an eavesdropper. Alarms and failure diagnosis on QKD links include the increase of QBER implying that eavesdropping is launched against a quantum channel, or the loss of quantum channel is increased [ITUY3804]. Both observables in that sentence are moved by this family: the error-rate children raise the first and A-0120 raises the second. So the defender's automated response is triggered by an adversary who, in every one of these twelve techniques, is stealing nothing.

The response itself is exploitable. Faulty key managers, key-management links, QKD modules and QKD links are recommended to be de-activated, and reconfiguration is made by controlling an optical switch or splitter, or by bringing a backup quantum channel into service [ITUY3804]. An adversary who can induce the alarm can therefore drive the network into taking its own components out of service and into consuming its own backup capacity, which is a second-order denial produced by the defence rather than by the attack. The library copy read is the 09/2020 first edition and later Recommendations cite a 2025 edition, so this note names the Recommendation rather than relying on its clause numbering.

L4 — System Control & Orchestration Secondary Effect

Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical) is the primary target, and it is where seven of this family's twelve children act. Three kinds of act land here. Light is added: laser dazzling or bright-light flooding of the receiver's single-photon detector, which [Krelina2023] identifies as the most susceptible target in a quantum node. Light is removed: the fibre is bent until no light passes or the beam is obstructed, or the insertion loss is quietly raised so the link stays up and starves. Or the light is left alone and a property of the medium is moved, as when the transmittance of a controlled span is varied, or the optical synchronisation channel is injected into so the recovered clock no longer triggers the detector at the right instant.

Where this layer's involvement stops. Permanent damage to the detector is not part of this technique: every child of A-0047 carries reversible effect persistence, and [Krelina2023] places dazzling in the band that has no permanent effect, with blinding, meaning temporary or permanent damage to the detector, and structural damage in the bands above it. Those belong to the Destruction subtree, A-0038 and the laser-damage rows, not here. The same source warns that the threshold between dazzling and blinding is almost impossible to predict, so an operator raising the power leaves this layer's mapping and this family at the same moment.

L1 — Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical) Primary Target

Post-Processing and Cryptographic is where eight of the twelve children land. For five of them the damage is done here rather than on the wire: the abort decision that ends the round is taken in parameter estimation, the authentication tag that an impostor's occupation consumes covers the whole post-processing transcript, the distillation pipeline that a saturation attack overruns is a post-processing function, the key-relay re-encryption a held relay corrupts is another, and so is the key-identifier exchange that A-0130 alters. Those five, A-0124, A-0125, A-0126, A-0127 and A-0130, map this layer as their primary target rather than as a knock-on, and they are also the five that sit on the third of the three attack vectors [Krelina2023] names, the classical command-and-control link, which is why the layer is where they act rather than where they are felt. The other three, A-0121, A-0122 and A-0123, reach it as a secondary effect of an act performed on the quantum layer. It is recorded as secondary at the parent because the majority of routes act physically and reach this layer through the input they feed it, which is the relation [ITUY3815] describes when it separates a quantum-layer failure from a key-management-layer one and treats them as different problems with different controls.

L5 — Post-Processing & Cryptographic Secondary Effect
Techniques Relating to This One 2
Relation type Description Technique
Alternative to

Denial (A-0047) is the sibling family in the same tactic and produces the same immediate picture, a link that makes no key. The two are told apart by what happens next: a Denial route ends when the attack ends and the service returns by itself, while a Destruction route leaves damage that outlasts the threat actor, so the service returns only when the operator repairs, replaces or restores something. The relation is recorded as an alternative because a threat actor who wants an outage can choose either family, but the sources describe a continuum rather than two clean options, and the crossing cannot be predicted from either side: "the threshold between dazzling and blinding is almost impossible to predict" [Krelina2023], and for a damage attempt the outcome "is thus impossible to predict prior to testing" [Makarov2016]. An operator should therefore treat a Denial event at the top of its power band as a possible Destruction event until the hardware has been re-characterised.

A-0048 Destruction
Preceded by

This acquisition step precedes the Denial technique that consumes its output. The laser weapon system, tracking and targeting capability and deployment platform acquired here are exactly the equipment A-0047 requires, and both rows draw that inventory from [Krelina2023].

A-0022 Acquire Infrastructure
See Also
A-0045 Intercept-and-Resend Attack
A-0046 Acquired Key Abusing
A-0048 Destruction
A-0049 Quantum Trojan-Horse Attack (THA)
A-0053 External Magnetic Field Attack on Optical Isolators and Circulators