Destruction

System

Destruction is the family of techniques in which the threat actor (Eve) puts a quantum-communication asset out of service and leaves damage behind. Nothing is read and no key is stolen. The transmitter (Alice) and the receiver (Bob) stop producing key, and the service does not come back when the threat actor stops: an operator has to repair, replace or restore something first. The family's reach is the functionality of quantum key distribution, quantum computing and quantum sensing systems, taken out either by physical damage or by corruption of the data the system depends on.

Three techniques sit under this parent.

  • Non-Kinetic Physical Attack (A-0037). The threat actor damages the hardware from a distance and without touching it, aiming a high-power laser or a high-power microwave beam at the receiver's optics and detector, or at the supporting electronics of a node, an optical ground station or a satellite [Krelina2023,Krelina2023a].
  • Direct Physical Attack (A-0038). The threat actor reaches the equipment and wrecks it by hand: cutting out a span of fibre, smashing or carrying off a module, setting off a charge at a node or a ground station, or destroying the power and cooling a site runs on [Krelina2023,ITUX1713].
  • Firmware / Calibration-Data Corruption (A-0128). The threat actor reaches the node over its management or maintenance interface and overwrites the firmware or destroys the calibration data, after which a module built to specification fails its own power-up integrity check and refuses to emit anything until an operator repairs it [ETSI008,ITUX1713].

Two neighbours are deliberately outside this family, because in both the point of the damage is to open a door rather than to stop the service. Damage delivered through a device's own optical port, leaving it running with parameters the threat actor chose, is Laser Damage Attack on Quantum Communication Systems (A-0058). A calibration write that the next clean calibration clears is Persistent Calibration Sabotage (A-0129).

Literature 8
[Bugge2014] A. Bugge, S. Sauge, A. Ghazali, J. Skaar, L. Lydersen, and V. Makarov. "Laser Damage Helps the Eavesdropper in Quantum Cryptography" In: Phys. Rev. Lett. 112, 070503. (2014) 10.1103/PhysRevLett.112.070503.
[ETSI008] ETSI. "Quantum Key Distribution (QKD); QKD Module Security Specification". (2010) https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_gs/QKD/001_099/008/01.01.01_60/gs_QKD008v010101p.pdf.
[ITUX1713] ITU-T. "ITU-T X.1713: Security requirements for the protection of quantum key distribution nodes". (2024) https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.1713-202404-I/en.
[ITUY3821] ITU-T. "ITU-T Y.3821: Quantum key distribution networks - Requirements for resilience". (2024)
[Krelina2023] M. Krelina. "Quantum Communication Countermeasures" (2023) 10.48550/arXiv.2310.08728. arXiv:2310.08728.
[Krelina2023a] Michal Krelina. "The Prospect of Quantum Technologies in Space for Defence and Security" (2023) 10.1016/j.spacepol.2023.101563.
[Krelina2025] Michal Krelina, Tom Sorger, Bob Dirks. "SQOUT: A Risk-Based Threat Analysis Framework for Quantum Communication Systems" (2025) 10.1016/j.cose.2026.105034. arXiv:2510.23462. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2026.105034.
[Makarov2016] V. Makarov, J.-P. Bourgoin, P. Chaiwongkhot, M. Gagné, T. Jennewein, S. Kaiser, R. Kashyap, M. Legré, C. Minshull, and S. Sajeed. "Creation of backdoors in quantum communications via laser damage" In: Phys. Rev. A 94, 030302(R). (2016) 10.1103/PhysRevA.94.030302.
QID: A-0048
UUID: 48a83b75-d80a-44c5-b637-9a2f705b0e2f
Tier: T0
Type: Hybrid
Domain(s):
  • Quantum Communication
  • Quantum Computing
  • Quantum Sensing & Imaging & Metrology
Tactic: Impact
Created: 2024-01-19
Updated: 2026-11-12
Maturity: Theoretical
Technique properties

Attack type: Degradation, Destruction
Target party: Receiver, Transmitter
Target function: Quantum layer, System control and management, Key management
Quantum channel: Fibre optic, Free space
Security layers: L1 — Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical) L2 — Electronics & Analog Components L3 — Firmware & Software Drivers L4 — System Control & Orchestration L5 — Post-Processing & Cryptographic
Maturity: Theoretical
Operational properties

Technique → Countermeasures 2
Description Countermeasure

Continuous device functionality monitoring answers one specific case in this family and not its main one, and the scope matters because overstating it would credit the control with stopping an outage it cannot stop. The main case needs no monitor: a cut span, a melted detector and a module in an error state all announce themselves. What monitoring buys is the case Bugge2014 names, where the threat actor "could for instance wait for a power outage, and perform the damage when the system is unpowered" [Bugge2014], so a system can come back up damaged and be trusted anyway unless it is re-characterised before service resumes. Monitoring characteristics during operation rather than only at installation is that paper's own recommendation. That is one case out of several, and the control's main benefit, catching characterisation drift on a device that keeps running, belongs to the A-0058 branch rather than to this family.

CM-0012 Continuous Device Functionality Monitoring

Rerouting answers the consequence rather than the act, and it is one of the two controls on this parent that reach all three children, the other being its alternative CM-0151: a cut span, a destroyed node and a bricked module all leave the same question of where the traffic goes. Krelina2023 names the control directly, since "A natural mitigation strategy involves switching to backup Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) links or rerouting the quantum connection" [Krelina2023]. What makes it expensive here is that the quantum case cannot borrow the classical one, where there is "the ability to reroute traffic in the event of a line or node being severed, typically without major consequences" [Krelina2023], and the cost of not having it scales with sparseness, since "the risk of space-born quantum communication denial is higher with lower deployment" [Krelina2023a]. For this family the spare that matters is the spare module or node rather than the spare route, because a second terminal on a destroyed span, or in a destroyed building, shares the fate of the first.

CM-0085 Quantum Network Traffic Rerouting
Technique → Security Layers 5
Description Category Impact Type

System Control and Orchestration, a secondary target of this family. The governing Recommendation enumerates the node's physical entities that boundary protection must cover, and the QKDN controller and the QKDN manager are among them, so destroying a site takes the control plane with it [ITUX1713]. The same clause states the active case, that "Attackers can also interrupt, influence and even take control of the operations of QKDN physical entities and their interfaces" [ITUX1713], which is also the plane child A-0128 crosses to reach the firmware or calibration store. Secondary rather than primary because no child targets the control plane for its own sake: A-0038 destroys it as part of a site, and A-0128 passes through it.

L4 — System Control & Orchestration Secondary Effect

Post-Processing and Cryptographic, covering key management, a secondary target. The key manager is one of the node's enumerated physical entities that boundary protection must cover, so a destroyed site destroys key management along with the optics [ITUX1713]. This layer is why the loss matters beyond the one link: "a partially corrupted QKD node can lead to failures of the security of keys relayed using a corrupted QKD node where no honest path exists" [ITUX1713], so on a trusted-relay chain the loss of one site reaches traffic that never passed through it. Secondary because no child attacks key management as its objective; the layer is lost with the asset that holds it.

L5 — Post-Processing & Cryptographic Secondary Effect

Firmware and Software Drivers, the primary target of child A-0128, which reaches this layer over the node's management or maintenance interface and overwrites the firmware image or the calibration store [ITUX1713]. On a module built to specification the corruption does not produce corrupted operation. The module fails its power-up software integrity test, enters an error state, and "shall not perform any cryptographic operations or output data via the data output interface while in an error state" [ETSI008], so the effect is a total stoppage rather than a degradation. The effect is also recoverable rather than irreversible, because the same specification enumerates the ways out: "this may include maintenance of the module, re-powering the module, automatic module recovery, or returning the module to the vendor for servicing" [ETSI008]. It still belongs to this family because the module stays down until an operator acts, which is the family test rather than whether hardware was destroyed.

L3 — Firmware & Software Drivers Primary Target

Physical Layer (Quantum and Optical), the primary target of this family and the only layer where its destruction has actually been measured. High-power laser illumination and optical or component sabotage permanently damage detectors and spatial filters [Bugge2014,Makarov2016]: the detector at the end of the optical path is blinded permanently between 1.2 and 1.7 W, where "the laser damage blinding is permanent and does not require continuing illumination", and at 2 W and above it is an open circuit, because "the bonding wires melted off, leaving the device an open circuit" [Bugge2014]; in a commercial fibre system the damaged component was the detector that monitors incoming light against Trojan-horse attacks [Makarov2016].

Two further routes reach the same layer without any illumination at all, and they are most of child A-0038. A span of installed fibre is cut out or pulled, which needs only "prior knowledge of the location of the optic fibres or quantum nodes for a successful execution" [Krelina2023]. And a transmitter or receiver module is smashed or carried away inside a node, whose physical entities the governing Recommendation enumerates and requires to be protected against interruption [ITUX1713].

One qualification on permanence: the catalogue's own annealing recovery control CM-0122 is scoped to elevated dark counts and explicitly not to the destructive bands, so the bands this family occupies are the ones recovery cannot reach.

L1 — Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical) Primary Target

Electronics and Analog Components, a secondary target of this family, reached two ways. Child A-0038 wrecks the power and cooling a site runs on, which takes the analog and electronic subsystems with the site. Child A-0037's microwave arm induces voltages and currents in the node's supporting electronics directly, without passing through the optics, and that arm is in scope only by the argument that "a satellite for quantum communication is a usual satellite with quantum-optical and optical payloads" so the classical counterspace toolkit applies to it unchanged [Krelina2023a]. The only normative hook for it is a threat listing rather than a requirement, that classical side-channel attacks "typically involve detecting some outputs from the modules (e.g., power consumption, radiative electromagnetic (EM) signals, etc.) or applying external forces (EM waves, control of temperature, voltage, etc.)" [ITUX1713]. There is no immunity figure to hold a module to. The module security specification mandates environmental failure protection for temperature and voltage only, and its enumerated list of the magnitudes an evaluator must control runs to "darkness (when required), temperature, voltage, pressure, humidity, atmospheric chemical composition, mechanical vibrations and the presence of nuclear and any other ionizing radiation" with no electromagnetic field in it at all [ETSI008]. Thermal overloading is the other mechanism recorded against this layer.

L2 — Electronics & Analog Components Secondary Effect
Related Techniques 1
Relation type Description Technique
Alternative to

Denial (A-0047) is the sibling family in the same tactic and produces the same immediate picture, a link that makes no key. The two are told apart by what happens next: a Denial route ends when the attack ends and the service returns by itself, while a Destruction route leaves damage that outlasts the threat actor, so the service returns only when the operator repairs, replaces or restores something. The relation is recorded as an alternative because a threat actor who wants an outage can choose either family, but the sources describe a continuum rather than two clean options, and the crossing cannot be predicted from either side: "the threshold between dazzling and blinding is almost impossible to predict" [Krelina2023], and for a damage attempt the outcome "is thus impossible to predict prior to testing" [Makarov2016]. An operator should therefore treat a Denial event at the top of its power band as a possible Destruction event until the hardware has been re-characterised.

A-0047 Denial
See Also
A-0046 Acquired Key Abusing
A-0047 Denial
A-0049 Quantum Trojan-Horse Attack (THA)
A-0053 External Magnetic Field Attack on Optical Isolators and Circulators
A-0054 Phase-Remapping Attack