External Magnetic Field Attack on Optical Isolators and Circulators

System

Optical isolators and circulators are the components a QKD transmitter (Alice) relies on to stop light entering it backwards, and they get that one-way behaviour from a magnet. The threat actor (Eve) places a magnetic-field source next to the equipment and spoils that one-way behaviour, so light she injects is no longer blocked [Tan2022]. Nothing is stolen at this step and no key is read: the technique is a door opener, and its value is that a following light-injection attack, such as a Trojan-horse attack or a laser-seeding attack, can now reach Alice's optics [BSI2023]. BSI2023 names this technique 'Enabling light-injection attacks by application of external magnetic fields' [BSI2023].

Literature 2
[BSI2023] BSI. "Implementation Attacks against QKD Systems". (2023) https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Studies/QKD-Systems/QKD-Systems.pdf.
[Tan2022] H. Tan, W. Zhang, L. Zhang, W. Li, S. Liao, and F. Xu. "External magnetic efect for the security of practical quantum key distribution" In: Quantum Sci. Technol. 7 045008. (2022) 10.1088/2058-9565/ac7d07.
QID: A-0053
UUID: 20ec2350-bc87-4394-ab74-03f8fec153d5
Tier: T0
Type: Quantum
Domain(s):
  • Quantum Communication
Tactic: Initial Access
Created: 2024-01-30
Updated: 2026-11-12
Maturity: Experimental
Technique properties

Attack type: Door opener/Lowering security
Attack category: Trojan-horse attack
Target party: Receiver, Transmitter
Target function: Quantum layer
Quantum channel: Fibre optic
Security layers: L1 — Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical) L7 — Operational Security
Maturity: Experimental
Operational properties

Technique → Countermeasures 3
Description Countermeasure

External magnetic field monitoring.

CM-0036 External Magnetic Field Monitoring

Tan2022 section 4 performs exactly this practice on this attack, folding the measured isolation into the quantum-coin and trace-distance leakage bounds and recomputing the secret key rate. It does not stop Eve; it stops the operator claiming a key that is not there, and the result is that a strong enough field leaves the link with almost no key [Tan2022].

CM-0014 Full Device Imperfections Incorporation in Scientific Security Proof

Continuous functionality monitoring of the isolation itself, as opposed to monitoring the field; a detection control rather than a preventive one. BSI's general countermeasure C3 asks for this monitoring against laser damage [BSI2023]; the same check applies to an isolator degraded by a field.

CM-0012 Continuous Device Functionality Monitoring
Technique → Security Layers 2
Description Category Impact Type

Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical) — the attack applies an external magnetic field that perturbs a Faraday-effect optical isolator/circulator, collapsing its reverse-direction isolation at the optical/physical layer [Tan2022].

L1 — Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical) Primary Target

Operational Security. The attack needs a field source physically at the installation and, at deployed scale, a Helmholtz coil around the enclosure, so site access control and environmental electromagnetic monitoring are part of the defence rather than an afterthought [Tan2022].

L7 — Operational Security Secondary Effect
Related Techniques 3
Relation type Description Technique
Alternative to

Two independent routes reach the same failure of the same protective components. A-0053 shifts a Faraday rotator's bias with a magnetic field [Tan2022], an effect expected to last only while the field is applied; the laser-damage family deposits optical energy and alters the part permanently. Choosing between them trades persistence against the physical access and power each needs.

A-0058 Laser Damage Attack on Quantum Communication Systems
Precedes

A-0053 is the step before a Trojan-horse attack against a transmitter whose isolation would otherwise defeat it. BSI names the target of this technique as enabling other attacks and points at the Trojan-horse table; Tan2022 quantifies the result, a 236 dB three-isolator transmitter going from leak-free at 281 km to no secure key above 678.55 Gs [Tan2022].

A-0049 Quantum Trojan-Horse Attack (THA)
Precedes

A-0053 is also the step before a laser-seeding attack. Two 70 dB isolators reduce a 40 dBm injection to -100 dBm at Alice's source, which is negligible, but the same pair degraded to 10.9 dB each leaves 21.8 dB combined, at which point seeding is feasible again at the 0.6 mW control level [Tan2022].

A-0063 Laser Seeding Attack (LSA)
See Also
A-0048 Destruction
A-0049 Quantum Trojan-Horse Attack (THA)
A-0054 Phase-Remapping Attack
A-0055 Non-Random Phase Attack
A-0056 Partially-Random-Phase Attack