Laser Damage Attack on Quantum Communication Systems
The laser damage attack employs high-power laser pulses to compromise specific components within a quantum communication system [Bugge2014]. This type of attack can result in various outcomes, including the creation of backdoors for further quantum attacks like photon number splitting (PNS) or Trojan-horse attacks, or degradation of system performance (e.g., reduced detector efficiency) [Makarov2016]. Damage that only takes a system out of service is denial of service, catalogued under the Destruction techniques (A-0048). Laser damage can also alter passive protective components such as attenuators [Huang2020], and a wavelength multiplexer under high-power light emits new wavelength components that open a spectral side channel [Gao2025].
What makes this a family rather than a list of incidents is that the threat actor (Eve) creates the flaw herself. An initially perfect setup can be turned insecure without raising any alarms, so characterising a system once at installation is not enough to keep it secure [Bugge2014,Makarov2016]. The pattern repeats across components: attenuators, isolators and wavelength multiplexers were put at the transmitter output precisely as defences against light injection, and damaging them revives the attacks they were installed to stop, so this family often subtracts a defence rather than adding a fault [Gao2025].
| [Borisova2026] | E. V. Borisova, A. A. Ponosova, D. O. Trefilov, M. A. Petrov, V. Makarov. "Vulnerability of 1310-nm quantum key distribution systems to 1550-nm cw light-injection attacks" (2026) 10.1109/ICLO69056.2026.11624638. |
| [Bugge2014] | A. Bugge, S. Sauge, A. Ghazali, J. Skaar, L. Lydersen, and V. Makarov. "Laser Damage Helps the Eavesdropper in Quantum Cryptography" In: Phys. Rev. Lett. 112, 070503. (2014) 10.1103/PhysRevLett.112.070503. |
| [Gao2025] | Binwu Gao, Junxuan Liu, Ekaterina Borisova, Hao Tan, Mingyang Zhong, Zihao Chen, Qingquan Peng, Weixu Shi, Anastasiya Ponosova, Vadim Makarov, Anqi Huang. "Spectral side channels of wavelength-division multiplexer in quantum key distribution under laser damage" (2025) 10.1103/33cb-kvyp. arXiv:2512.11701. |
| [Huang2020] | A. Huang, R. Li, V. Egorov, S. Tchouragoulov, K. Kumar, and V. Makarov. "Laser-Damage Attack Against Optical Attenuators in Quantum Key Distribution" In: Phys. Rev. Appl., vol. 13, no. 3, p. 034017. (2020) 10.1103/PhysRevApplied.13.034017. |
| [Makarov2016] | V. Makarov, J.-P. Bourgoin, P. Chaiwongkhot, M. Gagné, T. Jennewein, S. Kaiser, R. Kashyap, M. Legré, C. Minshull, and S. Sajeed. "Creation of backdoors in quantum communications via laser damage" In: Phys. Rev. A 94, 030302(R). (2016) 10.1103/PhysRevA.94.030302. |
| [Peng2024] | Q. Peng, B. Gao, K. Zaitsev, D. Wang, J. Ding, Y. Liu, Q. Liao, Y. Guo, A. Huang, and J. Wu. "Security boundaries of an optical power limiter for protecting quantum key distribution systems" (2024) 10.1103/PhysRevApplied.21.014026. arXiv:2303.12355. |
| [Ponosova2025] | Anastasiya Ponosova, Irina Zhluktova, Daria Ruzhitskaya, Daniil Trefilov, Anqi Huang, Alexey Wolf, Vladimir Kamynin, Vladimir Tsvetkov, Vadim Makarov. "Pulsed laser attack at 1061 nm potentially compromises quantum key distribution". (2025) arXiv:2506.19091. |
| [Ruzhitskaya2026] | Daria Ruzhitskaya, Irina Zhluktova, Anastasiya Ponosova, Fedor Ushakov, Andrey Zverev, Galina Tertyshnikova, Tianyi Xing, Kirill Min'kov, Daniil Trefilov, Anqi Huang, Vladimir Kamynin, Vladimir Tsvetkov, Vadim Makarov. "Robustness of fiber-optic attenuators to 1061-nm sub-nanosecond pulsed laser radiation in quantum key distribution systems" (2026) 10.48550/arXiv.2604.25620. arXiv:2604.25620. https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.25620. |
| [Tan2025] | Hao Tan, Mikhail Petrov, Weiyang Zhang, Liying Han, Sheng-Kai Liao, Vadim Makarov, Feihu Xu, Jian-Wei Pan. "Wide-Spectrum Security of Quantum Key Distribution" (2025) 10.1103/smdh-dcpm. |
2cbf227d-0954-4afe-90ad-4b1740157895
- Quantum Communication
Technique properties
Operational properties
| Description | Countermeasure |
|---|---|
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Continuous device functionality monitoring is the general in-operation form of the control this family most directly defeats, and it applies at both parties rather than only at the receiver, which is what distinguishes it from the detector-only monitoring edge on this same entity. The gap it addresses is stated plainly: no deployed system has a mechanism to check all possible deviations in device characteristics from the modeled values [Makarov2016]. The honest form of the control is that it is advisable to monitor the characteristics of the system directly during QKD, or at least to bound them during QKD with sufficiently high probability [Bugge2014]. |
CM-0012 Continuous Device Functionality Monitoring |
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This link covers the spectral, bandpass and notch filter types of CM-0013, and only those. Spectral filtering is the direct answer to the wavelength axis: an eavesdropper can choose her attack wavelengths arbitrarily within the quantum channel passband to maximise the attack performance, exploiting spectral transparency windows of system components [Tan2025], and the measured out-of-band route lands roughly 500 nm outside the operating band [Ponosova2025]. Seen defensively, that is why free-space receivers already bound the attack: all free-space QKD systems employ a narrowband interference filter at the entrance, which forces damaging light aimed at components behind it into the passband [Bugge2014]. |
CM-0013 Employment of Optical Filters |
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An optical isolator at the transmitter output blocks light entering against the direction of transmission, and [Makarov2016] offers it with an architectural qualifier: an optical isolator (for Alice that uses one-way light propagation). Two-way and plug-and-play systems, where the encoded pulses must return, cannot fit a plain isolator at all. Where it does fit, deploying multiple isolators between the outermost component and the quantum channel is an effective approach [Gao2025]. Isolators made for 1310 nm systems isolate only about 11 dB at 1550 nm [Borisova2026]. |
CM-0008 Employment of Optical Isolation |
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A watchdog power meter at the port is proposed as a technology that may be applied against tampering at the entrances of Alice and Bob, and it is qualified in the same breath, because the laser-damage results clearly show that Eve might tamper with these countermeasures [Bugge2014]. This family contains the demonstration of that qualification, since its monitoring route destroys precisely such a photodiode and the alarm never fires again [Makarov2016]. |
CM-0011 Watchdog Detector |
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Detector monitoring covers the receiver half of this family only. Its specific difficulty here is that laser damage moves a detector's dark-count rate in either direction, permanently lowering it in one power band and permanently raising it in another, so a monitor calibrated once cannot tell which way to read a change. The consequence drawn is that it is tempting to simply subtract a calibrated dark count rate from the QBER, and that this is dangerous: all errors in the raw key must be treated as caused by eavesdropping [Bugge2014]. The transmitter routes [Makarov2016] demonstrates are outside this control's scope. |
CM-0017 Detector Monitoring |
| Description | Category | Impact Type |
|---|---|---|
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The physical quantum and optical layer is the primary target because the attack works entirely by depositing optical energy in a passive or optoelectronic element until its transfer function changes permanently, with no software, firmware or protocol step involved [Bugge2014]. The reason this layer is reachable at all is the founding structural argument of the family: classical devices' security-critical parts can be physically separated from the communication channel and isolated from physical access by the adversary, whereas the front end of a quantum communication system is essentially an analog optical system connected to the channel and is easily accessible by the adversary [Makarov2016]. |
L1 — Physical Layer (Quantum & Optical) | Primary Target |
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Secondary effect on electronics and analog components: laser damage targets analog optoelectronic elements such as the pulse-energy-monitoring photodiode and single-photon detectors, altering their electrical response downstream of the optical layer [Makarov2016]. |
L2 — Electronics & Analog Components | Secondary Effect |
| Relation type | Description | Technique |
|---|---|---|
| Alternative to |
Two independent routes reach the same failure of the same protective components. A-0053 shifts a Faraday rotator's bias with a magnetic field [Tan2022], an effect expected to last only while the field is applied; the laser-damage family deposits optical energy and alters the part permanently. Choosing between them trades persistence against the physical access and power each needs. |
A-0053 External Magnetic Field Attack on Optical Isolators and Circulators |
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