Techniques

The threat actor (Eve) may collect information on the victim's quantum communication module, which could be useful or necessary for future campaigns. This information may encompass various details such as software, firmware, post-processing techniques, quantum protocols, interfaces, electronics, optics, and more.

The threat actor (Eve) may collect information on the victim's quantum channel, which could be useful or necessary for future campaigns. This information may encompass various details, for example, about the optic fibre or free-space channel, its properties, and more.

Threat actors may gather information about the victim's quantum network that can be used or required for future campaigns. Information about the quantum network may include a variety of details about topology, control and management, etc.

The threat actor (Eve) may buy, lease, or rent infrastructure that can be used for future campaigns or to perpetuate other techniques. A wide variety of infrastructure exists for hosting and orchestrating adversary operations.

The threat actor (Eve) may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used for future campaigns or to perpetuate other techniques. By using compromised infrastructure, Eve may make it difficult to tie their actions back to them.

The threat actor (Eve) aims to access or compromise the classical communication channels used alongside quantum transmissions in quantum communication systems, exploiting these channels to perform own quantum attack.

Supply Chain Compromise involves the manipulation or interception of the components and processes used in the development, delivery, and maintenance of quantum systems, threatening the integrity and security of both their quantum and classical components.

Non-Kinetic Physical Attack on quantum systems involves methods that cause physical damage or dysfunction without direct contact, typically through the use of electromagnetic pulses (EMPs), high-powered lasers, or high-powered microwaves, targeting quantum computers, networks, and sensors.

Direct Physical Attack on quantum systems involves physical actions aimed at directly damaging or destroying quantum computing, networking, or sensing devices, utilizing methods such as explosives, mechanical destruction, or disruption of critical components like optical fibers.

Threat actors may attempt to dazzle the quantum communication receiver, causing high noise on a single photon detector. Note that dazzling is the equivalent of jamming from the radio frequencies but in the optical domain.

Adversary Post-Processing is a technique where the threat actor (Eve), having surreptitiously obtained the raw key material during a quantum key distribution (QKD) session, mimics the legitimate post-processing steps performed by the original communicating parties to derive the same final encryption key.

Threat actors may exfiltrate data from the raw quantum data, such as keys from the QKD, through the application of post-processing (key distillation) after being gathered using obtained information during Reconnaissance.

The threat actor (Eve) may have successfully executed a series of (quantum) techniques to obtain the cryptographic key and use this key to access, decrypt, or manipulate secure communications facilitated by QKD systems.

The threat actor (Eve) measures the electromagnetic radiation emitted by the transmitter (Alice) and/or receiver (Bob) to infer information about the generated key in a Quantum Key Distribution system.

The threat actor (Eve) can infer quantum states prepared by the transmitter (Alice) by analyzing the power consumption of the integrated electrical control circuit, using machine learning to correlate power with the transmitted states.