Experimental demonstration of a coherent detector blinding attack on a real CV-QKD system

System
  • Daniel Pereira, Vana Pezelj, Florian Prawits, Hannes Hübel
  • 2026
Abstract

<p>The authors present a novel implementation of a coherent detector blinding attack against a complete CV-QKD receiver, in which the eavesdropper hinders the receiver's ability to estimate the channel parameters and so hides the impact of a collective attack. Excess noise in excess of 2.5 SNU is reliably hidden. The paper also reports that an AC-coupled balanced detector defeats the naive constant-signal form of the attack but not a modulated one, and proposes countermeasures based on monitoring the receiver output.</p>

Identifier: Pereira2026
Type: Preprint
Year: 2026
arXiv: 2605.03572