Saturation Attack

The threat actor (Eve) injects light into the CV-QKD receiver (Bob) to saturate the detector, masking the increase of excess noise from an intercept-and-resend attack.


Literature

[Kumar2021] Rupesh Kumar, Francesco Mazzoncini, Hao Qin, and Romain Alleaum. "Experimental Vulnerability Analysis of QKD Based on Attack Ratings" In: Scientific Reports 11, 9564. (2021) 10.1038/s41598-021-87574-4.
[KunzJacques2015] S. Kunz-Jacques and P. Jouguet. "Robust shot-noise measurement for continuous-variable quantum key distribution" In: Phys. Rev. A 91, 022307. (2015) 10.1103/PhysRevA.91.022307.
[Qin2013] Hao Qin, Rupesh Kumar, and Romain All ́eaume. "Saturation attack on continuousvariable quantum key distribution system" In: Proceedings Volume 8899, Emerging Technologies in Security and Defence; and Quantum Security II; and Unmanned Sensor Systems X; 88990N. (2013) 10.1117/12.2028543.
[Xu2022] S. Xu, Y. Li, Y. Mao, and Y. Guo. "Counteracting a Saturation Attack in Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution Using an Adjustable Optical Filter Embedded in Homodyne Detector" In: Entropy 24, 383. (2022) 10.3390/e24030383.

QID: A-0098
Tier: T0
Type: Quantum
Tactic: Defense Evasion
Created: 2024-06-20
Updated: 2024-08-12

Technique → Countermeasures

List of countermeasures applicable to this technique.

Items: 6
Description Countermeasure

Discarding non-linear data blocks.

Use of watchdog detector. Especially, the monitoring of the first-order moments (mean values) can be effective.

Use of adjustable optical filter [Xu2022].

Using real-time quadrature measurements with random optical attenuations.

Employ the CV version of MDI-QKD protocol.

Use machine learning with pattern recognition.