Double-Click Attack
The Double-click attack in quantum key distribution systems exploits simultaneous detection events in both detectors of a chosen basis at the receiver's (Bob's) end. By employing an intercept-and-resend strategy with re-sent states as intense multi-photon pulses, the threat actor (Eve) can induce double-click events when Bob's basis selection is incompatible with the re-sent state. Properly leveraging these events allows Eve to gain knowledge of the key, as the double-clicks, often discarded by QKD protocols, filter out non-manipulated detection events, leaving only those controlled by Eve.
Literature
[Beaudry2008] | N. J. Beaudry, T. Moroder, and N. Lütkehaus. "Squashing Models for Optical Measurements in Quantum Communication" In: Phys. Rev. Lett. 101, 093601. (2008) 10.1103/PhysRevLett.101.093601. |
[Fung2011] | C.-H. F. Fung, H. F. Chau, and H.-K. Lo. "Universal squash model for optical communications using linear optics and threshold detectors" In: Phys. Rev. A 84, 020303(R). (2011) 10.1103/PhysRevA.84.020303. |
[Koashi2008] | T. Kobayashi, A. Tomita, and A. Okamoto. "Evaluation of the phase randomness of a light source in quantum-key-distribution systems with an attenuated laser" In: Phys. Rev. A 90, 032320. (2008) 10.1103/PhysRevA.90.032320. |
[Luetkenhaus1999] | N. Lütkehauss. "Estimates practical quantum cryptography" In: Phys. Rev. A 59, 3301. (1999) 10.1103/PhysRevA.59.3301. |
[Luetkenhaus2000] | N. Lütkehauss. "Security against individual attacks for realistic quantum key distribution" In: Phys. Rev. A 61, 052304. (2000) 10.1103/PhysRevA.61.052304. |
Technique → Countermeasures
List of countermeasures applicable to this technique.
Items: 2
Description | Countermeasure |
---|---|
Randomly assign double clicks to a single click [Beaudry2008,Fung2011]. |
|
Consider the attack in your security proof |