Blinding Attack Using Dead Time

The Blinding Attack Using Dead Time exploits the inherent dead time of Avalanche Photodiodes (APDs) in QKD systems to gain knowledge of the key without needing to detect legitimate quantum signals. By selectively blinding all detectors except one during their dead time, the attacker can ascertain which detector remains active during a legitimate detection event, bypassing the need for complex faked-state strategies.


Literature

[Qi2007] B. Qi, C. Fung, H. Lo, and X. Ma. "Time-shift attack in practical quantum cryptosystems" In: Quant. Inf. Comp. 7, 073–082. (2007) 10.26421/QIC7.1-2-3.
[Weier2011] H. Weier, H. Krauss, M. Rau, M. Frst, S. Nauerth, and H. Weinfurter. "Quantum eavesdropping without interception: an attack exploiting the dead time of single-photon detectors" In: New Journal of Physics 13, 073024. (2011) 10.1088/1367-2630/13/7/073024.
[Zhao2008] Y. Zhao, C. Fung, B. Qi, C. Chen, and H. Lo. "Quantum hacking: Experimental demonstration of time-shift attack against practical quantum-key-distribution systems" In: Phys. Rev. A 78, 042333. (2008) 10.1103/PhysRevA.78.042333.

QID: A-0076
Tier: T0
Type: Quantum
Tactic: Execution
Created: 2024-04-11
Updated: 2024-08-20

Technique → Countermeasures

List of countermeasures applicable to this technique.

Items: 3
Description Countermeasure

Use of other protocols, such as MDI-QKD.

Employment of bit-mapped gating.

Employ the upconversion technique.