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Blinding Attack on Self-Differencing APDs
The blinding attack on self-differencing Avalanche Photodiodes (SD APDs) exploits the detector's inability to discriminate between avalanche signals caused by legitimate quantum signals and those resulting from afterpulsing when subjected to increased photon flux. This attack leverages the SD technique's vulnerability, rendering the APDs blind to genuine quantum communications and enabling intercept-and-resend attacks.
Literature
[Gao2022] | B. Gao, Z. Wu, W. Shi, Y. Liu, D. Wang, C. Yu, A. Huang, and J. Wu. "Strong pulse illumination hacks self-differencing avalanche photodiode detectors in a high-speed quantum key distribution system". (2022) arXiv:arXiv:2205.04177 [quant-ph]. |
[Jiang2013] | M. Jiang, S. Sun, G. Tang, X. Ma, C. Li, and L. Liang. "Intrinsic imperfection of self-diferencing single-photon detectors harms the security of high-speed quantum cryptography systems" In: Phys. Rev. A 88, 062335. (2013) 10.1103/PhysRevA.88.062335. |
[KoehlerSidki2018] | A. Koehler-Sidki, J. Dynes, M. Lucamarini, G. Roberts, A. Sharpe, Z. Yuan, and A. Shields. "Best-Practice Criteria for Practical Security of Self-Diferencing Avalanche Photodiode Detectors in Quantum Key Distribution" In: Phys. Rev. Appl. 9, 044027. (2018) 10.1103/PhysRevApplied.9.044027. |
[KoehlerSidki2018a] | A. Koehler-Sidki, M. Lucamarini, J. Dynes, G. Roberts, A. Sharpe, Z. Yuan, and A. Shields. "Intensity modulation as a preemptive measure against blinding of single-photon detectors based on self-differencing cancellation" In: Phys. Rev. A 98, 022327. (2018) 10.1103/PhysRevA.98.022327. |
Technique → Countermeasures
List of countermeasures applicable to this technique.
Items: 5
Description | Countermeasure |
---|---|
Employ the upconversion technique. |
|
Employment of bit-mapped gating. |
|
Include this attack in your security proof. |
|
Prior hardware study. |
|
Use of other protocols, such as MDI-QKD. |