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Full Device Imperfections Incorporation in Scientific Security Proof
Incorporating all device imperfections into the scientific security proof of quantum communication systems ensures robustness by accounting for all potential vulnerabilities after implementing countermeasures.
Literature
| [Bochkov2019] | M. Bochkov and A. Trushechkin. "Security of quantum key distribution with detection-efciency mismatch in the single-photon case: Tight bounds" In: Phys. Rev. A 99, 032308. (2019) 10.1103/PhysRevA.99.032308. |
| [Cao2015] | Zhu Cao, Zhen Zhang, Hoi-Kwong Lo, and Xiongfeng Ma. "Discrete-phase-randomized coherent state source and its application in quantum key distribution" In: New Journal of Physics 17, 053014. (2015) 10.1088/1367-2630/17/5/053014. |
| [CurrasLorenzo2022] | G. Curras-Lorenzo, K. Tamaki, and M. Curty. "Security of quantum key distribution with imperfect phase randomisation" In: Quantum Sci. Technol. 9, 015025. (2024) 10.1088/2058-9565/ad141c. arXiv:arXiv:2210.08183 [quant-ph]. |
| [CurrasLorenzo2023] | Guillermo Currás-Lorenzo, Margarida Pereira, Go Kato, Marcos Curty, Kiyoshi Tamaki. "A security framework for quantum key distribution implementations" (2023) 10.48550/arXiv.2305.0593. arXiv:arXiv:2305.05930 [quant-ph]. |
| [Curty2019] | M. Curty and H. Lo. "Foiling covert channels and malicious classical post-processing units in quantum key distribution" In: npj Quantum Information 5, 14. (2019) 10.1038/s41534-019-0131-5. |
| [Fung2009] | C. Fung, K. Tamaki, B. Qi, H. Lo, and X. Ma. "Security proof of quantum key distribution with detection efficiency mismatch" In: Quantum Information and Computation 9, 131–165. (2009) 10.26421/QIC9.1-2-8. |
| [Gottesman2004] | D. Gottesman, H.-K. Lo, N. Lutkenhaus, and J. Preskill. "Security of quantum key distribution with imperfect devices" In: Quantum Information and Computation Vol.4 No.5. (2004) 10.26421/QIC4.5-1. |
| [Lo2007] | H.-K. Lo and J. Preskill. "Security of quantum key distribution using weak coherent states with nonrandom phases" In: QIC, vol. 7, no. 5 & 6, pp. 431–458. (2007) 10.26421/QIC7.5-6-2. |
| [Lucamarini2015] | M. Lucamarini, I. Choi, M. Ward, J. Dynes, Z. Yuan, and A. Shields. "Practical security bounds against the trojan-horse attack in quantum key distribution" In: Phys. Rev. X 5.3 (2015), pp. 1–19. (2015) 10.1103/PhysRevX.5.031030. |
| [Maroey2017] | Ø. Marøy, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar. "Secure detection in quantum key distribution by real-time calibration of receiver" In: Quantum Sci. Technol. 2, 044013. (2017) 10.1088/2058-9565/aa83c9. |
| [Metger2022] | Tony Metger and Renato Renner. "Security of quantum key distribution from generalized entropy accumulation" In: Nat Commun 14, 5272. (2023) 10.1038/s41467-023-40920-8. arXiv:arXiv:2203.04993 [quant-ph]. |
| [Navarrete2022] | A. Navarrete and M. Curty. "Improved Finite-Key Security Analysis of Quantum Key Distribution Against Trojan-Horse Attacks" In: Quantum Science and Technology 7.3 (2022), p. 035021. (2022) 10.1088/2058-9565/ac74dc. |
| [Pereira2022] | Margarida Pereira, Guillermo Currás-Lorenzo, Álvaro Navarrete, Akihiro Mizutani, Go Kato, Marcos Curty, Kiyoshi Tamaki. "Modified BB84 quantum key distribution protocol robust to source imperfections" (2022) 10.48550/arXiv.2210.11754. arXiv:arXiv:2210.11754 [quant-ph]. |
| [Sixto2023] | Xoel Sixto, Guillermo Curras-Lorenzo, Kiyoshi Tamaki, and Marcos Curty. "Secret key rate bounds for quantum key distribution with non-uniform phase randomization" In: EPJ Quantum Technol. 10, 53. (2023) 10.1140/epjqt/s40507-023-00210-0. arXiv:arXiv:2304.03562 [quant-ph]. |
| [Tamaki2014] | K. Tamaki, M. Curty, G. Kato, H. Lo, and K. Azuma. "Loss-tolerant quantum cryptography with imperfect sources" In: Phys. Rev. A 90, 052314. (2014) 10.1103/PhysRevA.90.052314. |
| [Tamaki2016] | K. Tamaki, M. Curty, and M. Lucamarini. "Decoy-state quantum key distribution with a leaky source" In: New Journal of Physics 18 (2016), p. 065008. (2016) 10.1088/1367-2630/18/6/065008. |
| [Trushechkin2022] | A. Trushechkin. "Security of quantum key distribution with detection- efficiency mismatch in the multiphoton case" In: Quantum 6, 771. (2022) 10.22331/q-2022-07-22-771. |
| [Wang2020a] | W. Wang, K. Tamaki, and M. Curty. "Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution with Leaky Sources" In: Scientific Reports 11 (2021), p. 1678. (2021) 10. 1038/s41598-021-81003-2. |
| [Zapatero2021] | V. Zapatero and M. Curty. "Secure quantum key distribution with a subset of malicious devices" In: npj Quantum Information 7, 26. (2021) 10.1038/s41534-020-00358-y. |
| [Zapatero2021a] | V. Zapatero, A. Navarrete, K. Tamaki, and M. Curty. "Security of quantum key distribution with intensity correlations" In: Quantum 5, 602. (2021) 10.22331/q-2021-12-07-602. |
| [Zhang2021a] | Y. Zhang, P. Coles, A. Winick, J. Lin, and N. Lutkenhaus. "Security proof of practical quantum key distribution with detection-efficiency mismatch" In: Phys. Rev. Research 3, 013076. (2021) 10.1103/PhysRevResearch.3.013076. |
| [Zhao2007] | Yi Zhao, Bing Qi, and Hoi-Kwong Lo. "Experimental quantum key distribution with active phase randomization" In: Appl. Phys. Lett. 90, 044106. (2007) 10.1063/1.2432296. |
Technique → Countermeasures
List of techniques where this countermeasure can be applied.
Items: 15
| Description | Technique |
|---|---|
|
Proper implementation of the PNS attack in the calculation of the secure key rate leads to a proper amount of privacy amplification [Gottesman 2004]. |
Photon-Number-Splitting (PNS) Attack |
|
Quantifying FM imperfections and taking them into account in the security analysis [Wang2013]. |
Passive Faraday Mirror Attack |
|
Consider this attack in your security proof, [Huang2018]. |
Timing Mismatch Attack on Signal and Decoy States |
|
Consider this attack in your security proof [Zhao2008a,Zhao2010]. |
Laser Seeding Attack on Two-Way Scheme |
|
Include this attack in your security proof. |
Blinding Attack on Self-Differencing APDs |
|
Consider this attack in your security proof. |
Frequency Side Channel Attack in Twin-Field QKD |
|
Incorporate the imperfection in security proof. |
Non-Random Phase Attack |
|
Include this attack in the full security proof. |
Partially-Random-Phase Attack |
|
Consider this attack in your security proof. |
Detector Efficiency Mismatch Attack |
|
Consider the attack in your security proof |
Double-Click Attack |
|
Implement this attack to security proof. |
Frequency-Shift Attack |
|
Include the attack in your security proof. |
Spatial Misalignment Exploitation in QKD |
|
Include this attack in your security proof. |
Information Leakage Through Electromagnetic Radiation |
|
Include this attack in your security proof (because it is just a partial key leakage). |
Detector Control by Exploiting Superlinearity |
|
Consider the attack in the security proof. Including adjusting the security parameters based on observable data at the receiving end, ensuring that the final key remains secure despite any detected vulnerabilities [Molotkov2020b]. |
Side Channel Exploitation in Transmitter Imperfections |