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Power Analysis Masquerading and Obscuring
This countermeasure incorporates several tactics to obscure the power consumption patterns that could otherwise be exploited to infer sensitive key information. These methods focus on altering the detectable computational behaviour without affecting the integrity or outcome of the reconciliation process. These methods, for example, include: Randomizing Power Consumption, Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling, Randomization of Syndrome Computation Order, Insertion of Dummy Operations.
Literature
[Kim2021] | G. Kim, D. Park, H. Kim, and S. Hong. "Side Channel Vulnerability in Parity Computation of Generic Key Reconciliation Process on QKD" In: International Conference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence (ICTC), Jeju Island, Korea, Republic of, 2021, pp. 257-261. (2021) 10.1109/ICTC52510.2021.9620820. |
[Park2021] | D. Park, G. Kim, D. Heo, S. Kim, H. Kim, and S. Hong. "Single trace side-channel attack on key reconciliation in quantum key distribution system and its efficient countermeasures" In: ICT Express 7, 36–40. (2021) 10.1016/j.icte.2021.01.013.. |
Technique → Countermeasures
List of techniques where this countermeasure can be applied.
Items: 1
Description | Technique |
---|---|
Apply Power Analysis Masquerade |
Power Consumption Analysis Attack on State Preparation in QKD Systems |