Photon-Number-Splitting (PNS) Attack
The Photon-Number-Splitting (PNS) attack targets quantum communication systems that use multi-photon pulses. In this strategy, a threat actor (Eve) exploits the fact that these pulses can contain more than one photon carrying the same information, allowing them to split off one photon, measure it, and leave the communication seemingly undisturbed.
Literature
[BSI2023] | BSI. "Implementation Attacks against QKD Systems". (2023) https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Studies/QKD-Systems/QKD-Systems.pdf. |
[Bennet1992] | C.H. Bennett, F. Bessette, G. Brassard, L. Salvail, J. Smolin. "Experimental quantum cryptography" In: J. Cryptology 5, 3–28. (1992) 10.1007/BF00191318. |
[Bennett1984] | C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard. "Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin tossing". In: Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Computers, Systems and Signal Processing, volume 175, page 8. New York, 1984. (1984) |
[Brassard2000] | G. Brassard, N. Lutkenhaus, T. Mor, and B. Sanders. "Limitations on Practical Quantum Cryptography" In: Phys. Rev. Lett. 85 (2000), p. 1330. (2000) 10 .1103/PhysRevLett.85.1330. |
[Felix2001] | S. Felix, N. Gisin, A. Stefanov, and H. Zbinden. "Faint laser quantum key distribution: eavesdropping exploiting multiphoton pulses" In: Journal of Modern Optics 48 (2001), pp. 2009–2021. (2001) 10.1080/09500340108240903. |
[Gottesman2004] | D. Gottesman, H.-K. Lo, N. Lutkenhaus, and J. Preskill. "Security of quantum key distribution with imperfect devices" In: Quantum Information and Computation Vol.4 No.5. (2004) 10.26421/QIC4.5-1. |
[Liu2011] | W. Liu, S. Sun, L. Liang, and J. Yuan. "Proof-of-principle experiment of a modifed photon-number-splitting attack against quantum key distribution" In: Phys. Rev. A 83 (2011), p. 042326. (2011) 10.1103/PhysRevA.83.042326. |
[Lutkenhaus2000] | N. Lutkenhaus. "Security against individual attacks for realistic quantum key distribution" In: Phys. Rev. A 61 (2000), p. 052304. (2000) 10.1103/PhysRevA.61.052304. |
[Lutkenhaus2002] | N. Lutkenhaus and M. Jahma. "Quantum key distribution with real- istic states: photon-number statistics in the photon-number splitting attack" In: New Journal of Physics 4 (2002), p. 44. (2002) 10.1088/1367-2630/4/1/344. |
[Mailloux2016] | L. O. Mailloux, D. D. Hodson, M. R. Grimaila, R. D. Engle, C. V. Mclaughlin, and G. B. Baumgartner. "Using Modeling and Simulation to Study Photon Number Splitting Attacks" In: IEEE Access 4, 2188. (2016) 10.1109/ACCESS.2016.2555759. |
[Scarani2004] | V. Scarani, A. Acn, G. Ribordy, N. Gisin. "Quantum Cryptography Protocols Robust against Photon Number Splitting Attacks for Weak Laser Pulse Implementations" In: Phys. Rev. Lett. 92 (2004), p. 057901. (2004) 10.1103/PhysRevLett.92.057901. |
Technique → Countermeasures
List of countermeasures applicable to this technique.
Items: 5
Description | Countermeasure |
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Proper implementation of the PNS attack in the calculation of the secure key rate leads to a proper amount of privacy amplification [Gottesman 2004]. |
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Privacy amplification can secure the key distribution process even in the presence of some level of eavesdropping. |
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These involve sending additional pulses with varying numbers of photons, including single-photon pulses, to detect eavesdropping attempts through statistical analysis of the quantum channel's behavior. |
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Employing another quantum communication protocol which is inherently PNS attack resistant. For example, using a modified BB84 protocol with non-orthogonal states [Scarani2004] |
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Use of true single-photon sources: Implementing quantum communication systems that can reliably produce single-photon pulses significantly reduces the vulnerability to PNS attacks. |